University of Washington School of Law

UW Law Digital Commons
Articles

Faculty Publications

1998

Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of
Internet Commerce
Jane Kaufman Winn
University of Washington School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, and the Internet
Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1177 (1998),
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/faculty-articles/160

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at UW Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles by an authorized administrator of UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu.

Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation
of Internet Commerce
Jane Kaufman Wren*
Can commercial transactions conducted over the Internet be regulated by existing
commercial law doctrines? Many promoters of Internet commerce argue that business done
over open computer networks such as the Internet will require a new regulatoryframework In
fact, many issues raised by Internet commerce have already been considered at length in the
context of electroniccommerce conducted over closedcomputer networks, such as those used in
financial markets. One of the most hotly debated issues regarding the regulation of Internet
commerce is the question of what would be the online equivalent of a signature. Some have
argued that, because new technology using public key cryptography is uniquely suited to
resolving this issue,public key cryptographyshould be promoted with special legislation. These
claims for preferential treatment should be viewed with skepticism, however, when they are
advanced by those marketing the technology before there have been any large-scale adoptions
of the technology in question. The desirability of technology-specific legislation should be
especially suspect if it comes at the expense of consumer protection provisionsfound in the
regulation of equivalent electronicfinancial services such as credit cards or electronicfunds
transfers. A technology-neutralapproachto Internet commerce legislation will permit parties
to commercial transactions to make up their own minds about what new business practices
make sense for Internet commerce. If any special legislation is needed to promote sound
business practices in Internet commerce at this early stage in its development, it would be
technology-neutralconsumer protection legislation, not protectionsfor technology developers
andpromotersbefore the risks associatedwith theirproductshave become apparent.
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Commercialization of the Internet has precipitated a lively, wideranging debate over how Internet business transactions should be
regulated. In recent months, for example, almost every state, the
federal government, and the United Nations have considered or taken
action on the issue of what constitutes the online equivalent of a
signature.' This apparently esoteric controversy goes to the heart of
how parties will create binding contracts online and is the first of what
will certainly be a flood of legal issues arising out of the migration of
conventional business transactions to the Internet. The popularity of
the Internet has already triggered vigorous debate over the protection
of free speech and privacy rights in this new environment, as well as
1.
On July 9, 1997, the Domestic and International Monetary Policy Subcommittee
of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services held the first in a series of
hearings on the role of the federal government in regulating electronic authentication
procedures; on July 24, 1997, the U.S. Department of Commerce held a Forum on Certificate
Authorities and Digital Signatures. In 1995, the following states passed laws addressing
some aspect of the use of authentication procedures: California (CAL. HEALTH & SAFMET
CODE § 102875 (West 1995)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19A-25A (1995)); and Utah
(UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (1995)). In 1996, the following states passed laws
addressing some aspect of the use of authentication procedures: Arizona (ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 41-121.13 (West 1995)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 2706(a) (1997));
Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.70-75 (West 1996)); Hawaii (HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. Div. 4,
'lit. 32, ch. 601 (Michie 1996)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-15-1 to -6 (Michie
1996)); Virginia (1996 Virginia S.B. 923); and Washington (WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.34
(West 1996)). In 1997, the following states passed laws addressing some aspect of the use of
authentication procedures: Colorado (COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4-9-413 (West 1997));
Georgia; Illinois (15 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/14.01 (West 1997)); Indiana (IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-24-1-1 to -3-4 (West 1997)); Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. § 48A.13 (West 1997));
Louisiana (LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:2145 (West 1997)); Maine (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
29-A, § 1410 (West 1997)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325 K.001 to .26 (West 1997));
Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-63-1 to -11 (1997)); Missouri (Ann. Stat. § 105.477
(West 1997)); Nevada (1997 Nevada S.B. 42); New Hampshire (1997 New Hampshire S.B.
207); Oklahoma (1997 Oklahoma H.B. 1690); Oregon (1997 Oregon H.B. 3046); Rhode
Island (1997 Rhode Island H.B. 6118); Tennessee (1997 Tennessee H.B. 1718); and Texas
(1997 Texas H.B. 984). On March 12, 1997, UNCITRAL published the Report of the
Working Group on Electronic Commerce dealing with authentication procedure issues
(A/CN.9/437). Summaries of the various state, federal, and international initiatives are
available at the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Information Technology Division web site
(visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http'//www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal/> and at the McBride, Baker,
and Coles law firm web site (visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http://www.mbc.comds_surn.htm>.
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over such issues as how Internet access should be priced and how
domain names should be allocated. Whether commercial transactions
conducted over the Internet should be subject to special regulation is
now moving to the forefront of these debates. As businesses scramble
to exploit the global reach of the Internet and technology vendors
compete to build an infrastructure for those transactions, lawmakers
are being lobbied to consider a wide array of legislation designed to
regulate this nascent market.
This Article addresses the controversy surrounding how to
establish both the identity of a party and his or her intent to be legally
bound in an Internet business transaction. Authentication procedures
comprised of technical, business, and legal elements can solve this
problem. In a conventional business environment, establishing intent
to be bound is usually unproblematic as a matter of law, because the
law regarding signatures, forgeries, and apparent authority is well
established. Exactly how these existing doctrines should be translated
into the Internet context, however, is far from clear. The Internet is an
open, public network. The same openness that attracts businesses into
the Internet also gives rise to the thorny computer security problems
that have triggered the debate over authentication procedures. Parties
can feel confident that they have formed binding contracts while
communicating over open networks only if they use reliable
authentication procedures. These authentication procedures are,
however, only one element to be taken into account in the design of a
trustworthy computer system. Their reliability is deternined by the
overall security of the system, in its design as well as in its
administration.
What constitutes a reasonable authentication
procedure or a trustworthy computer system in government and
business environments is unclear, given how rapidly information
technologies are changing and developing. How the concepts of a
reasonable authentication procedure or trustworthy computer system
will be applied to individual consumers entering into contracts online
is even less clear.
Part of the current debate over authentication procedures for
Internet business transactions is being driven by the marketing of
cryptographic technology products. These computer security products
resolve some of the problems of establishing identity and intent to be
bound in a contract formed over an open network with an
authentication procedure generally known as "digital signatures." 2
2.
AMERICAN

See INFORMATION SECURrTY COMMrITEE, SECTION OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY
BAR

ASSOCIATION,

DIGrTAL

SIGNATURE:

LEGAL

INFRASTRUCTURE

FOR
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Proponents of these cryptography products are advocating "technology
specific" legislation that endorses what they believe is the best solution
available to the problem of authentication over insecure networks.
Proponents of "technology neutral" legislation believe that any
residual disparities between the legal status of conventional and
electronic commerce should be eliminated by new legislation, but that
none of the many competing business models for electronic commerce
security solutions should yet be given a legislative endorsement.
In order for parties to enter into binding contracts in an open
network environment such as the Internet, they must have a reliable
way to recognize manifestations of intent to be legally bound. In
addition, they must have confidence that the manifestations of intent
that they rely upon are genuine and have not been altered in transit
over the network. While simple passwords or personal identification
numbers are often used to connect a person with activities online,
cryptographic solutions bind persons with online actions in a much
more sophisticated way. In addition, cryptographic solutions assist in
determining whether the message has been tampered with in transit.
Without reliable information about the context from which the signed
electronic message originates, however, an electronic signature created
with cryptography is no more evidence of a party's intent to be bound
than a facsimile ink signature made with a signature machine can
evidence intent to be bound without any information about how the
machine has been used. The recipient of an electronic message can
feel confident that a binding contract has been formed not just from the
security applied to the message itself, but with the knowledge that it
originated from a system that has implemented an appropriate overall
level of security procedures.
Business conducted over the Internet is expanding rapidly, but it
is not yet encumbered with an intrusive, unresponsive regulatory
structure. In the absence of a compelling showing that competitive
market forces are failing to achieve a fair and efficient result, legal
issues raised by the migration of business activity to the Internet
should not become a pretext for heavy-handed government
intervention. At this time it is still unclear which technical and
business standards, including standards for authentication procedures,
will gain widespread acceptance. It is equally unclear what costs and
benefits will accrue to businesses moving into the Internet, including
the costs of breaches in computer security caused by fraud or
CEMrFICATION AuTHoRIIEs AND SECURE ELECrRoNIc 3-4 (1996) (visited Jan. 20, 1998)
<http://www.abanet.org/Scitech/eciscl>.
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negligence associated with operating in an open network environment.
In the absence of any concrete information about what constitutes
reasonable business practices and reasonable computer security
standards in this new environment, it is unclear what will constitute a
fair and efficient loss allocation system.
In crafting a legal framework to govern the novel issues raised by
Internet business transactions, costs associated with fraud and
negligence should be allocated in a manner likely to reduce the
individual incidences of loss and to promote investments that will
reduce the overall magnitude of losses incurred in the system. The
risk of loss due to fraud should be put on the party most capable of
preventing the fraud, to the extent that it has a deterrent effect.
However, the cost of unavoidable fraud losses should be distributed
among providers or users through an insurance scheme. Similarly, any
party capable of designing improvements to the system that will
reduce the overall incidence of loss in a cost effective manner should
be given incentives to do so.
The parties to Internet business transactions include consumers
and merchants, as well as technology vendors, who are competing to
build the infrastructure for this emerging marketplace. Large amounts
of time and effort have been invested in identifying and addressing
legal issues from the perspective of developers of the technology
infrastructure, while far less time and effort have been invested in
identifying and addressing the legal issues that the merchants and
consumers will face in this new environment. As a result, some states
have enacted legislation that promotes specific technologies by
sheltering the promoters of these technologies from certain liabilities.
However, the developers of the technological infrastructure of Internet
commerce should not be exempted from certain categories of legal
risks, if leaving open the possibility of common law liability provides
those promoters. with reasonable incentives to design better systems.
No legislative guidance has yet been proposed on what
constitutes reasonable security standards for merchants and consumers
entering the Internet marketplace. Existing or proposed legislation that
promotes the use of cryptographic authentication procedures in
business transactions in effect promotes the adoption of a complex and
risky technology by relatively unsophisticated parties before adequate
safeguards have been established. It is very unlikely that individual
end users will be able to implement the same security practices used in
the military or sophisticated corporate environments (such as bank
wire transfer departments), where computer security programs using
cryptography were first developed. However, it is also unclear what
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individual end users can reasonably be expected to do. The
presumption of validity that attaches to traditional signatures as
reliable evidence of intent to be bound is based on a well-established
connection consistently observed over centuries. Although some
"technology specific" legislation creates a presumption of validity for
a digital signature, there is not yet any basis in experience for
extending that same presumption of validity to an electronic
authentication procedure.
Legislating a partial risk allocation scheme before there are any
well-established Internet business practices seems doomed to create an
intrusive, unresponsive regulatory framework where none now exists.
Until there is more knowledge about how new technologies will
actually be used by the merchants and consumers they are designed to
benefit, new legislation to enable Internet commerce should be
technology-neutral. Meanwhile, existing legislation and common law
precedents should be reevaluated in light of new technological
business practices. Legislation tailored to promote the fair and
efficient operation of the Internet marketplace can be written only in
light of that knowledge and experience. In any event, before
legislative safe harbors are created exempting the most technologically
sophisticated participants in the Internet marketplace from liability,
attention should be focused on how these technologies will affect end
users and what risk of loss is appropriate for end users to assume.
This Article will first describe the context in which digital
signature applications are being developed. The Internet is a novel
business environment, because it is a global, open network of
computers. Open networks may provide greater access at lower
infrastructure costs than closed networks, but they bring along the
expense of greater security risks. At present, various groups are
advancing different models of how Internet electronic commerce can
be accomplished from technical and business perspectives; many of
the competing models include digital signature technology
administered in different forms. The second part of this Article
examines how existing law treats signatures as evidence of intent to be
legally bound and allocates the risk of loss due to forgeries or
unauthorized signatures. This includes the law of signatures under
contract law and negotiable instruments law, as well as the existing
laws governing the use of authentication procedures in electronic
funds transfers. This Article next reviews the ABA digital signature
guidelines as a conceptual framework for "technology specific"
legislation and the recent electronic commerce law passed in Rhode
Island as a model of technology-neutral legislation. It compares those
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models to the existing law of signatures and authentication procedures.
Finally, this Article reviews the policy issues raised by "technology
specific" legislation, the rules for allocating fraud losses in commercial
transactions, and the problem of market failure due to imperfect
calculation of risk by consumers in complex transactions.
If.

IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

A.

Open Networks and DistributedComputing

Electronic commerce is as old as the telegraph, and businesses
have relied on computers for decades. The emergence of the Internet
as a global information infrastructure, however, has pushed the issues
raised by the use of electronic communications and networked
computers to the forefront of developments in commercial law.
Businesses in all sectors of the U.S. economy are struggling to
understand what impact these new technologies will have on their
current operations, to find ways to cope with the rapid pace of change
and development in information technologies, and to discover what
new opportunities all these changes are producing.
The "information revolution" now unfolding is the result of the
convergence of many social and technological forces that has brought
major changes in business in its wake.3 Vice President Albert Gore
recently observed that the United States is
on the verge of a revolution that is just as profound as the change in the
economy that came with the industrial revolution. Soon electronic
networks will allow people to transcend the barriers of time and
distance and take advantage of global markets and business
opportunities not even imaginable4 today, opening up a new world of
economic possibility and progress.
The new opportunities developing from the merging of computing and
telecommunications technology has resulted in legal issues that are
only beginning to emerge.
While the widespread use of computers in business began forty
years ago, the sharp drop in the price of computing power in recent
years has accelerated the process of substituting information
processing by people with automated information processing. Current
desktop computers can provide each employee with more computing
3.
See Peter H. Lewis, The Revolution Will Be Televised, N.Y TIMES, August 28,
1995, at D3; NIcHoLAs NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGrrAL (1995).
4.
See President William J. Clinton & Vice-President Al Gore, Jr., A Frameworkfor
Global, Electronic Commerce, dated July 1, 1997 (visited Jan. 20, 1998)
<http:llwww.iitf.nist.gov/eleccomm/ecomm.htm>.
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power than was available to entire enterprises in the early days of
The expansion and deregulation of
mainframe computing.
telecommunications has promoted the more rapid exchange of
information over networks of computers. Developments in digital
technology now permit the conversion of a wide array of traditional
media into digital media that can be transmitted over computer
networks. The advent of relational database programs and "enterprise
management software" has permitted the integration of disparate
operating divisions of a business into a single information system.
Information systems based on earlier mainframe computing
technology were distinct operations that were spatially segregated
from other business operations by the demands of the computer
systems themselves. Mainframe computers required temperature
controlled, dust-free environments; they were maintained by specially
designated and trained'staff. Programmers were required to bridge the
gap between the complexity and inflexibility of computing processes
and the diversity of the end users' needs. Data entry and data
processing were distinct tasks with recognizable
boundaries defined by
5
staffing and equipment configurations.
The development of personal computers began to change that
business/computer interface. Individuals with no knowledge of
computer programming could use computers to accomplish a wide
variety of tasks. Certain phenomenally popular software programs
such as the Visicalc and Lotus 1-2-3 spread sheet programs, or the
WordPerfect word processing program, revolutionized the way many
routine business tasks were accomplished and made personal
computers a necessity in many business environments. In response to
these changes, the number of employees charged with maintaining
information systems equipment and accessing or inputting data
increased.6 Information technology personnel no longer needed to be
isolated by the demands of the computer system. Instead, they could
work in a variety of environments throughout the organization.
Professional programmers or information systems managers retained
responsibility for maintaining mainframe systems, but those systems
were increasingly connected to networks of personal computers.
Access to computer resources with mainframe computers was
5.
See P. Holbrook & J. Reynolds eds., Site Security Handbook; Internet
Engineering Task Force Request for Comments 1244 4 (July 1991) (visited Jan. 19, 1998)
<ftp://ds.intemic.net/rfc/ffc1244.txt>.
6.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUrERs AT RISK: SAFE COMPUrING IN
THE INFORMATION AGE 11 (1991) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CoMPurmS AT
RISK].
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provided through the use of dumb terminals. With the advent of
personal computers, the "client/server" model of organizing computer
resources came into vogue, allowing multiple local computer "clients"
to share files or allocate functions through a "host" or "server"
computer.
The use of networked computers in a business environment is not
simply a consequence of the widespread use of personal computers.
Financial industries were early pioneers in the use of networked
computers for funds transfer systems.7 Also, electronic contracting
conducted over electronic data interchange systems generally relied on
"value-added networks" that provided secure connections between
trading partners!
The technical standards that permitted the
interoperability of these networks were public standards, such as those
developed by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) or the
International Standards Organization (ISO), standards set by trade
associations or industry consortia, or private, proprietary standards.
The change from segregated mainframe systems to distributed
networks of personal computers resulted in both costs and benefits.
The cost associated with distributing access to information systems is
not limited to the expense of purchasing and maintaining the hardware
and software involved, although that may be very substantial. In order
for employees to make use of equipment, obviously they must be
adequately trained in its use. Furthermore, in order to safeguard
financial and physical assets, computers must be integrated into the
existing administrative and control systems. The benefits include the
increased flexibility in distributing information within organizations
and the ability to collect and process information about products and
markets more rapidly. In addition, the rapidly falling price of
information processing power has permitted many businesses to
collect and manage information as an asset of the organization that
was previously undervalued and underexploited. One of the great
benefits of linking enterprise information systems with an open
network such as the Internet has been the ability to provide marketing
and customer service online without the expense of engineering
9
around proprietary or incompatible computer system standards.

7.

See DONALD I. BAKER & ROLAND E. BRANDEL, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND

TRANSFER SYSTEMS 1 1.03 (1996).
8.

1996).
9.
at Cl.

See BENJAMIN WRiGHT, THE LAW OF ELERONIc COMMERCE

§ 1.1.4 (2d ed.

See Steve Lohr, Business to Business on the Internet,N.Y. TIMES, April 28, 1997,
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The Internet is an international network of computers based on
open, public technical standards.10 The Internet began in 1969 as an
outgrowth of a military program called "ARPANET." 1 This program
"was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense
contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to
communicate with one another by redundant channels[,] even if some
portions of the network were damaged in a war."12 When traffic on
ARPANET reached levels that were too high for the network to
handle, the National Science Foundation (NSF) stepped in to create a
compatible network that would service that portion of the traffic used
by different research institutions around the country to facilitate
nondefense research.13 This network became known as NSFNET.
Although there is no longer a central organization governing the
Internet, there are organizations that formulate the technical 1standards
4
that permit the Internet to operate and to continue to develop.
The Internet has grown considerably since its birth:
The number of 'host' computers-those that store information and
relay communications-increased from about 300 in 1981 to
approximately 9,400,000 by... 1996. Roughly 60% of these hosts are
located in the United States. About 40 million people used the Internet
[in 1996], a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by
1999.
Individuals can obtain access to the Internet from many different
sources .... Most colleges and universities provide access for their
students and faculty; many corporations provide their employees with
access through an office network; many communities and local libraries
provide free access, and an increasing number of storefront "computer
coffee shops" provide access for a small hourly fee. Several major
national "online services" such as America Online, CompuServe, the
Microsoft Network, and Prodigy offer access to their own extensive
proprietary networks as well as a link to the much larger resources of
the Internet. In 1996, these commercial online
services had almost
15
twelve million individual subscribers [in 1996].
The architecture of the Internet reflects its Cold War origins. The
Department of Defense wanted a network that could withstand partial
10. See Barry M. Leiner, The Past and Future History of the Internet; The Next 50
Years: Our Hopes, Our Visions, OurPlans,40:2CoMMuNIcATIONS OFTtEACM 102 (1997).
11.
An acronym for the network developed by the Advanced Research Project
Agency. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329,2334 (1997).
12. Id.
13. See Martin Moore, Introducingthe Internet,in THE INrTERNEr UNLEASHED 1996
10-22 (Billy Barron et al. eds., 1995).
14. See id
15. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
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outages (whether from bomb attacks or a backhoe cutting network
cables) and still function. 6 The technical solution to this problem was
a decentralized network of computers that could communicate with
every other computer on the network as a peer.17 This required a
minimum of information to be transmitted and received effectively,
assigning the responsibility for completing the communication to the18
communicating computers, rather than a centralized control system.
This system is known - as a "packet switching" paradigm for
communication. The messages are broken into packets and each
packet is routed to the destination without any previously established
communication path before the message packets are reassembled and
checked for integrity by the receiving computer.' 9
From a technical perspective, the Internet is a network of
networks based on TCP/IP protocols, a community of people who use
and develop those protocols, and a collection of resources that can be
reached from those networks. 20 TCP/IP refers to the networking
protocols that establish the Internet: the Transmission Control
Protocol and Internet Protocol. 1 While the Internet is a computer
network based on these protocols, it also has gateways to other
networks and services that are based on other protocols. Each
computer connected to the Internet has software that manages the
connection to the network. This software can translate data to and
from a format that can be transmitted over the Internet and a format
that can be used locally.
Under the sponsorship of the National Science Foundation, the
Internet was used as a federally funded wide area network for the
academic and research communities. 22 As a result of government
support, the NSF was able to implement an "acceptable use" policy
that prohibited the use of the network backbone services for other than
research and education purposes. Commercial development of
TCP/IP networking standards began in the early 1990s with private
initiatives such as the Computer Internet Exchange Association and
CO+RE (commercial and research). a Because of interest shown by
16. See E.Krol & E. Hoffman, "What is the Internet?": Internet Engineering Task
ForceRequestfor Comments 1462 (May1993). Requests for Comments can be downloaded
from (visited Jan. 18, 1998) <ftp://ds.intemic.netlrfcrfc1462.txt>.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id
20. See id
21. See Moore,supra note 13, at 10-22.
22. See Leiner, supra note 10, at 102.
23. See COMMUNICATIONS DAILY, vol. 12, no. 112, at 4 (June 10, 1992).
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private enterprises and the uncertainty of future government funding,
the NSF began preparing for the future privatization of the Internet
which culminated in the 1995 turnover of the backbone to commercial
providers, such as MCI, Sprint, and Advanced Network Systems.24
When there was no longer an acceptable use policy in effect for
Internet communications, the commercial exploitation of the Internet
began on a large scale.25 Local and regional networks that had
previously developed using the TCP/IP standard were fully integrated
into the Internet.
The Internet is composed of many different systems, some that
merely support the exchange of e-mail messages between different
computer systems and some that support the storage and retrieval of
information in a wide variety of formats. The "World Wide Web"
consists of information that is formatted with "hyper-text markup
language," which permits information to be organized with
"hypertext" links or jumps between two related concepts or files. The
organization of files by optional jumplinks between related ideas,
rather than an enforced hierarchy determined by the author, permits the
person accessing the information to delve into matters in as much or as
little depth as the reader desires. Files are transferred from the servers
where they reside to client machines using the "hypertext transfer
protocol." The World Wide Web (the "Web") became a mass media
phenomenon with the development of "web browser" programs that
permit personal computers to access a wide variety of files from web
sites. Web browsers permitted users to view graphics, hear sound
files, or watch digital video clips, as well as to read text.
The initial popularity of the web was driven by the development
of its graphical user interface, which simplified access to the
mountains of data already present on the Internet.26 The Web
continues to develop to allow ever greater interactivity between the
user accessing the Web with a browser on a personal computer and the
information available on the web server hosting the web site files. For
example, web sites may now be constructed that permit visitors to
search databases or to have other computing functions performed on

24. See idl
25. The "Very High Performance Backbone Network Service," currently under
development by the National Science Foundation to create an upgraded Internet with fiber
optic lines, now has an "acceptable use policy" that limits its use to academic and research
purposes. See Deborah Shapley, Now Playing in Limited Release: Internet, the Next
Generation,N.Y. TMES, Jan. 27, 1997, at Dl.
26. See Matthew V. Ellsworth, The Future of the Internet, in THE INTERNET
UNLEAsHED 1996 34-35 (Billy Barron et al. eds., 1995).
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the web server. These enhanced functions are widely used in Internet
electronic commerce applications.
The National Research Council has noted that the Internet is now
"open" in at least the following four senses.2 7 It is open to users
because it does not force users into closed groups or deny access to
any sectors of society but instead permits universal connectivity, like
the telephone system.28 It is open to service providers because it
provides an open and accessible environment for competing
commercial and intellectual interests.29 For example, competitive
access for information providers is pennitted. It is open to network
providers because any network provider can meet the necessary
requirements to attach and become a part of the aggregate of
interconnected networks.30 It is open to change because it continually
permits the introduction of new applications and services. It is not
limited to only one application, as in television. It also 31
permits the
introduction of new technologies as they became available.
B.

Trustworthy Systems and CommunicationSecurity

The openness of the Internet is a major factor explaining its
revolutionary impact. This same openness, however, exposes the
computer systems connected to it to greater security threats than those
experienced by closed networks or systems that are not networked.
Although the graphical user interface provided by web browsers
makes the Internet easy for users to access, the browser software and
the corresponding server software are very complex. As a result,
Internet participants, both on the client and server side, may face
greater security risks than they realize.32
For example, in July 1997, a test of one computer system linked
to the Internet by a security expert inadvertently revealed thousands of
unprotected passwords on other computer systems linked to the
Internet around the world.33 In July 1997, over 2,000 consumers who
-

27.
See NATIONAL RESEARCH CoUNCIL, REALIZING THE INFORMATION FUTURE: THE
INTERNET AND BEYOND 44 (1994).

28. See id,
29. See id
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Jared Sandberg, On-Line: Accidental Hacker Exposes Internet's Fragility,
WALL. ST. J., July 10, 1997, at B1.
33. See id This followed revelations of flaws in Microsoft's Internet Explorer
security that would permit users to access Internet sites booby-trapped to destroy data on the
users' computers and flaws in Microsoft's Windows NT operating system that permitted
unauthorized access to system users' passwords. See Bill Richards, Microsoft's Wmdows NT
Has a Flaw in Security, ComputerExperts Claim, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1997, at B1.
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used the popular NBA.com web site (maintained by Starwave
Corporation for ESPN Sports Zone) to order NBA merchandise
received anonymous e-mail reporting back to them the information
they had transmitted to a supposedly secure web site, including their
credit card information. The interlopers claimed to be publicizing the
lack of security at the popular
site to make consumers aware of the
34
risks of Internet commerce.
While more limited uses of the Internet, such as displaying
graphics and text in the format of a printed document, might seem less
at risk from security threats, the Department of Justice learned that this
was not the case in 1996, when its web site was vandalized by hackers
protesting the perceived censorship
of the Internet by the
35
Communications Decency Act.
Whether a computer system is secure is something that can never
be demonstrated in any absolute sense. Computer security is a relative
concept that can be established by identifying potential threats to the
system and designing safeguards to protect the system from those
threats. 36 Computer systems that have been designed to provide the
best security available in -light of the system's intended functions are
therefore referred to as "trustworthy" computer systems.37 A
"trustworthy" computer system must provide confidentiality for
information that is subject to access restrictions, maintain information
integrity by preventing its corruption or destruction, and guarantee
system availability so that users have access to information whenever
it is needed.38 Computer security policies must address all these issues
and be integrated with
39 security policies that safeguard other assets in
order to be effective.
Threats to the security of computer systems are not limited to
computers connected to the Internet. Threats may come from a variety
of sources: disgruntled employees, self-help remedies by technology
34. Starwave reported that the breach of security had been accomplished through the
actions of an insider, not as a result of the penetration of their system from the outside.
Although, this was probably little or no comfort to the individuals involved. See Mark Smith,
Security Breakdown, PMrSBURGH POST-GAZ=ra, July 13, 1997, at C3.
35. See SimSON GARFINKEL & GENE SPAFFORD, WEB SECURrTY AND COMMERCE 187
(1997).
36. See NATIONALRESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPuTERS ATP SK, supra note 6, at 13.
37. A "trustworthy system" is defined as "[c]omputer hardware, software, and
procedures that: (1) are reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; (2) provide a
reasonably reliable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; (3) are reasonably
suited to performing their intended functions; and (4) adhere to generally accepted security
principles." INFORMA.ION SECURITY COMMITrEE, supranote 2, at 69.
38. See RrrA C. SUMMERS, TnRErs AD SAFEGUARDS 3 (1997).
39. See id. at 103.
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providers, attacks from outsiders, or even natural disasters such as
disruption in electric power supplies or floods.40 Preparations for an
attack can be made by social engineering (tricking the people who
know how to access the system into voluntarily releasing the
information), dumpster diving (collecting computer manuals or
printouts from trash bins), or war dialing (computer-controlled dialing
of all numbers in a range). Malicious codes can be planted in a system
through the use of "trap doors," 'Trojan horses," or masquerading and
spoofing (assuming the identity of an authorized user or recognized
system).4 1 The objectives of attacks include eavesdropping,
destruction of valuable data, denial of service (by overloading the
system with improper traffic), theft of service, or disarming system
safeguards.42
The magnitude of security problems experienced by closed
network computer systems gives some indication of the problems that
businesses will face in opening their information systems to greater
connectivity through the Internet. According to the results of a 1996
survey of 1,300 information technology managers, 54% of the survey
respondents said that their company suffered a loss related to
information security and disaster recovery in the past two years; when
losses due to computer viruses are included, the proportion rises to
78%.43
In 1997, the General Accounting Office highlighted
information security in federal civil agencies as one of five areas in the
government that were at "high risk" of fraud, waste, or abuse.' The
GAO found that malicious attacks on government computers put
billions of dollars worth of assets at risk of loss and vast amounts of
sensitive data at risk of unauthorized disclosure.4 5 Even systems
designed for secure use by the military and financial institutions are
not immune from attack. Hackers hit Pentagon systems an estimated
250,000 times in 1995; about 64 percent of the attacks were
successful. 46 In 1994, a Russian computer programmer removed $10
million from Citibank customer accounts by initiating47unauthorized
funds transfers from a laptop computer in St. Petersburg.
40. Seeid. at71-91.
41. See id at 86-102.
42. See ic at 83.
43. See Bob Violino, The Security Facade,INFORMAtiON WEEK, Oct. 21, 1996.
44. See Stephen Barr, Identifying Risky Programs,WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1997, at 23.
45. See id
46. See id
47. Later, all but $400,000 was recovered. See David Gow & Richard NortonTaylor, Surfing SuperhighwaymenBanks Have Good Reason to FearThieves Who Hack Into
Their Secret Files,Tr GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 7, 1996, at 1.
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In an information economy, computer security plays role
equivalent to accounting and audit standards in a traditional paperbased economy. Information system security principles will need to be
integrated into the existing framework of risk management policies
used in business. Unlike security systems that safeguard physical and
financial assets based on public standards, such as Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles, there are not yet any general principles for
computer system security that businesses can turn to in developing
their security policies. In 1991, the National Research Council
advocated the promulgation of a comprehensive set of Generally
Accepted System Security Principles. However, no organization has
taken the lead in developing such standards in the intervening years. It
is unclear which federal agency or private standard-setting
organization has both the resources to undertake such a project and the
credibility necessary to win support for its proposals. In the private
sector it is unclear whether there is any trade association or industry
consortium that would have enough credibility with both system
designers and end users to propose such standards. In 1996, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development issued its
Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems, but these
guidelines are very general, aspirational statements that provide little
concrete guidance to computer system administrators. 49 Furthermore,
because the technology of information systems is in a rapid state of
development and change, it may not yet be possible to develop a set of
public standards similar to those used in accounting and finance.
Although there is no authoritative statement of generally
accepted system security principles, many principles are in fact widely
recognized as important in the design of secure systems50 One
principle used in the design of trustworthy security systems is that the
security of an entire computer system is only as great as the security of
the weakest link in the network of resources and users.51 Another
principle is that it does not make sense to spend more to protect
something than it would cost to replace it if it were lost.52 Thus, the
uses of computer systems and the value of the resources they store

48.

See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMPUTERS AT RISK, supra note 6, at 27.
49.
See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1996).

50. See SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 40-45.
51. See iL at 152 (discussing the principle of "complete mediation," in which every
access to every object must be controlled).
52. See Holbrook & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 10.
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must be analyzed in light of the overall operations and objectives of
the organization using the system.
The design of a trustworthy computer system should provide for
the following: authentication, access control, integrity, audit, and
availability. 53 Authentication permits verification of a user's identity
and is at the heart of the debate over digital signature legislation. A
secure system should provide access control to insure that only
legitimate users can access resources within the system. The "least
privilege" principle provides that no user should be allowed greater
access to system resources than is necessary to accomplish his or her
assigned functions. 4 Within networks, access control enforces
policies about which computers can be accessed and what data can be
transferred over the network. Through access control, information
integrity is guaranteed at the time the data enters the system, as well as
while it resides on the system or is in transit within the system."5 It is
also important that information systems are amenable to audit in order
to detect misuse that circumvents access controls. 6
Finally,
availability is paramount because of the cost associated with possible
destruction of resources or disruption of services.
These principles have been more fully articulated in standards for
individual application designs, as opposed to industry-wide standards.
The U.S. Department of Defense developed computer security
standards called the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC or the "Orange Book"), which defined different classes of
security corresponding to different levels of need. 7 The TCSEC
guidelines were developed with military objectives in mind, which are
unlikely to be identical to the objectives of a business conducting
electronic commerce. One reason is that the cost of implementing
systems conforming to military standards might be prohibitive in other
contexts.
One example of an industry-wide security standard was
developed by the National Association of Clearing Houses (NACHA).
NACHA has developed data security standards for its members, the
regional automated clearing houses (ACHs).5 8 The ACH network
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 11.
See itt at 9.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 12.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TRUSTED

COMPUTER SYSTEM EVALUATION CRITERIA,

58.

DOD 52000.28-STD (1985).

See NACHA Board of Directors Policy Statement on Data Security, in
OPERATING RULES OF THE NATIONAL AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, 1997, ACH
RULES at OR-xi (1997).
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creates a nationwide electronic payment system for businesses and
consumers that provide services like direct deposits and preauthorized
payments 5 9 The data security standards that govern electronic funds
transfers over the ACH system have been developed by the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee
(ASC) X12.6° The ASC X12 sets standards for electronic data
interchange, like electronic funds transfers. NACHA participates in
ANSI ASC X12 and recommends
that its members adopt ANSI
61
standards for data security.
With regard to Internet standards, the "Guidelines for the Secure
Operation of the Internet" (Guidelines) were published in 1991 as one
of the "Request for Comments" (RFC) document series that includes
descriptions of Internet protocols and other information relevant to the
Internet community.62 The first guideline provides that users are
individually responsible for understanding and respecting the security
policies of the systems they are using. 63 Furthermore, users are
59. See BAKER & BRANDEL, supranote 7, § 3.02.
60. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) was established in 1918 and
manages and coordinates private-sector standard-setting activities to support U.S. national
economic interests. Groups submit proposed standards to ANSI for approval. See CARL F.
CARGILL, OPEN SYsTEMs STANDARDIZArION: A BUsINEss APPROACH 244-45 (1997). ANSI
approves standards if it determines that the standard-setting process was open, that it included
the participation of everyone with a material interest in it, and that the proposed standard
represents the consensus among the participants. See id Private groups seek ANSI approval
because ANSI approved standards receive more support in the marketplace than those that
are not submitted to ANSI for approval. See id
61.

HENRY PERRrIT & MICHAEL BAUM, ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING, PUBLISHING AND

EDI LAw 234 (1991).
62. All Internet standards are published as RFCs; however, not all RFCs contain
Internet standards. FYI RFCs, for example, contain general background information on the
operation of the Interet. See Holbrook & Reynolds, supra note 5. The handbook is a
request for comments, not an Internet standard. The Internet standard setting remains an
open, consensus-building process that reflects its origins in academia. The Internet Society
(ISOC) is an independent, international professional society that is concerned with the
growth and evolution of the Internet. See MICHAEL FROOMKIN, THE GOVERNANCE OF THE
INTERNET (forthcoming 1998) (on file with author). The board of ISOC approves
appointments to the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), which has a veto power over
proposed Internet Standards. Standards may be proposed by anyone. Once a standard is
proposed, the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) establishes a working group to review the proposal, if the IETF and the IESG
conclude that such an action is merited by the proposal. See id. The IETF has no general
membership and consists primarily of volunteers. See id The working group reviews the
standard until a rough consensus is achieved. Then, the standard is passed to the IESG for
public review and publication as a draft standard. See id When a draft standard has been
tested and found sound, it can become an Internet Standard and is published as an RFC. See
id
63. See Guidelinesfor Secure Operationof the Internet, RFC 1281, § 1 (Nov. 1991)
<ftp://ds.internic.neL/rfcrfcl28l.txt>.
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individually accountable for their own behavior. 6" The second
guideline provides that users have a responsibility to employ available
security mechanisms and procedures for protecting their own data and
for assisting in the protection of the systems they use. 65 When these
guidelines were written, the idea was that individuals would be
capable of entering into binding contracts online, and the risk of being
held liable for the acts of another impersonating the user online had
not yet arisen as a security issue.
The Guidelines provide that computer and network service
providers are responsible for maintaining the security of the systems
they operate and are responsible for notifying users of their security
policies and any changes to these policies.66 Vendors and system
developers are responsible for providing systems that are sound and
that embody adequate security controls. 67 Users, service providers,
and hardware and software vendors are responsible for cooperating to
provide security, while those developing Internet protocols are charged
with including security considerations as part of the design and
development process.68
In addition to the general provisions of the Guidelines, there are
more specific Internet security standards set out in RFCs to provide
guidance for developers of Internet applications and site
administrators. For example, RFC 2078 Generic Security Service
Application Program Interface sets out programming standards for a
generic communications protocol governing authentication, integrity,
or confidentiality security
services. 69 RFC 1244 provides a Site
70
Security Handbook.
One dimension of a trustworthy or secure system is network or
communication security.71 Electronic contracting over the Internet
requires that parties wishing to enter into binding contracts have a
means of ascertaining whether a message is actually coming from the
party apparently sending it and whether the message has been altered
in transit. This legal concern can be addressed by computer security
64.
65.
66.

See id
See id §2.
See id.§ 3.

67.
68.

See id. § 4.
See id. § 5.

69. See J. Linn, Generic Security Service Application ProgramInterface, Version 2:
Internet Engineering Task Force Request for Comments 2078 (visited Jan. 18, 1998)

<ftp://rs.intemic.net/rfc/rfc2078.txt>.
70. See, e.g., Holbrook &Reynolds, supra note 5 (Site Security Handbook).
71.

See William A. Tanenbaum, Computer Security and Encryption FAQ, 14

COMPuTER LAw.,

July 1997, at 19.
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policies governing authentication procedures and guaranteeing
message integrity. Authentication can be based on something that the
user knows (such as a PIN or password), something that the user has
(such as an ATM card or other token device), or something that the
user is or does (such as a fingerprint or manual signature).72
Authentication procedures based on knowledge are very common and
are inexpensive to implement, but they are subject to well-known
weaknesses. Passwords chosen by users can often be guessed simply
by checking encrypted password files against encrypted dictionary
entries.473 Furthermore, they are often left where interlopers can find
7
them.

Token devices, such as memory cards (including ATM cards) or
smart cards (which include an embedded processor chip), cannot be
"guessed" but are more expensive to implement than password
authentication systems. 75 Token devices also require some interface
with the computer system, such as a card-reading device, which can
make the authentication procedure expensive to implement. Token
devices can also be used in combination with PINs or passwords, thus
increasing the system security.
Biometric authentication is based on physical or behavioral
characteristics and is often more expensive, more intrusive, and less
precise than other authentication procedures. Biometric authentication
procedures require that some characteristic of a user be sampled and
76
entered into the system, which is used to build a reference profile.
When the user invokes the authentication procedure, the characteristic
is measured again and compared with the reference profile.77 The
procedure must be set to tolerate variances between the current sample
and the reference profile. Consequently, setting the tolerance lower
will improve the accuracy of the authentication procedure, but at a cost
of infuriating legitimate users who are incorrectly rejected.78

72. See SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 340.
73. See id at 341.
74. In 1994, a freelance journalist was able to join British Telecom as a temporary
employee and access confidential files containing telephone numbers for Buckingham
Palace, the Prime Minister's office at Downing Street, and top-secret national security agency
M15 installations. He managed to accomplish this by copying a password his supervisor had
taped to the side of a computer monitor. See Tim Kelsey, The BTHacker Scandal Revealed:
How Hacker Penetratedthe Heart ofBritish Intelligence,Tm INDEPENDENT (London), Nov.

24, 1994, at 1.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See
See
See
See

Summers, supra note 38, at 348.
id at 349.
icL
d
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C. DigitalSignatures,CertificateAuthorities, and PublicKey
Infrastructure
The term "digital signature" is a term of art used to denote an
electronic signature that has been produced through public key
cryptography.79 In order to understand how digital signatures can
operate as authentication procedures, it is necessary first to examine
the basic functions of public key cryptography and how digital
signatures are created.
Cryptography is the process of taking some information (called
the plaintext) and passing it through an encryption process to produce
an encrypted copy of the information (called the ciphertext) that can be
decrypted and restored
to the original plaintext through the application
8°
of the cipher key.
Modem cryptography is based on encryption algorithms that
apply mathematical keys to plain text to produce ciphertext 8 ' The
strength of a cryptographic key is measured by how hard it would be
for an outsider to guess the key from the ciphertext. The longer the
mathematical key used, in general, the more secure the encryption
system will be from attack by outsiders.8 2 The size of a cryptographic
key is measured in bits, such as 56 bits or 128 bits.83 The more
samples of ciphertext that are available, the more information the
cryptanalyst has to work with in trying to break a key.84 Thus, an
important principle of cryptographic key management is that keys
should be retired at regular intervals and replaced with new keys. 5
79. The DigitalSignature Guidelinesdefine "digital signature" as a
transformation of a message using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a hash
function such that a person having the initial message and the signer's public key
can accurately determine (1) whether the transformation was created using the
private key that corresponds to the signer's public key, and (2) whether the initial
message has been altered since the transformation was made.
INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, supra note 2, at 42-43. While members of the
Information Security Committee (ISC) have attempted to establish this meaning as definitive,
the terms "electronic signature," "digital signature," and "digitized signature" are often used
interchangeably. See, e.g., 1997 Texas H.B. 984 (defining "digital signature" as an electronic
identifier intended by the person using it to have the same force and effect as a manual
signature).
80. Captain Midnight decoder rings provide a simple example of encryption. The
ring would contain a substitution cipher, in which each letter of the alphabet is substituted for
another letter or a number. If the substitution cipher is simply the alphabet in reverse order,
the plain text Captain Midnight becomes the ciphertext "Xzkgzrm Nrwmrtsg."
81. See GARFINKEL & SPAFFORD, supranote 35, at 187-208.
82. See id.
83. See SISON GARFINKEL, PGP: PRETTY GOOD PRIVACY 39(1995).
84. See GARFINKEL& SPAFFoRD, supranote 35, at 187-208.
85. See id
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There are two main types of cryptography: conventional (also
know as secret key or symmetric) and public key (also know as
asymmetric or dual key). 6 With conventional cryptography, the same
key is used to both encrypt and decrypt a message.8' The great
weakness of conventional cryptography is that the shared key must be
kept private. If the sender and recipient of the message are not in
direct personal contact, finding a system to distribute the keys securely
will present considerable logistical problems. These problems are
compounded by the need to retire the keys at regular intervals.
The U.S. military provides an excellent example of the complex
logistics necessary to use conventional cryptography successfully.
During the Cold War, secret keys were distributed by the U.S.
government using couriers that were handcuffed to locked briefcases
containing the keys. The couriers had neither the keys to the
handcuffs nor the keys to the briefcases. If the courier did not arrive
and turn over the contents of the 88briefcase intact, then the keys it
contained would not be put into use.
Such a system is hardly feasible in large-volume commercial
contexts. If a single key is needed for each pair of individuals or
organizations wishing to communicate securely, then within any large
community an extraordinarily large number of keys must be generated
and distributed to permit any one individual to communicate with any
other individual at will.
Development of a strong central
administration system that would be necessary
for private commercial
89
applications is not likely to be feasible.
Public key or asymmetric cryptography substantially solves the
problem of key distribution. Public key cryptography is based on a
mathematical breakthrough that permits the use of two different but
related keys to be used to encrypt and decrypt messages. 90 One key
86. See id
87. See GARFNKEL, supranote 83, at 40.
88. See id at 42.
89. As a practical matter, this may be difficult to achieve even in the context of
military security. In 1985, Ronald Pelton, a National Security Administration agent, was
discovered to have been revealing U.S. secret cryptographic keys to the Soviets. See id at
45. This problem could be solved if there were a central key distribution center trusted by all
the members of the community; the caveat is that compromise of the key distribution center
renders the system vulnerable to attack. See id Such a system has been in use in the U.S.
military and intelligence communities for years, but it requires a strong central administration
in order to be effective. See id.
90. For a basic introduction to asymmetric cryptography and its use in creating
digital signatures, see INFORMATION SECURrY COMMrrEE, supra note 2, at 3-16. The
tutorial contained in the Guidelines is available at <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/iscdsg-

toc.html> (visited Jan. 20, 1998).
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(known as the public key) can be freely distributed and used by
anyone. The other key, known as the private key, must be kept secure.
Although the two keys have a mathematical relationship to each other,
it is extremely difficult to use one key to guess the other.91 A public
key can be used to send a message to the holder of the private key.
The sender is assured that no one other than the holder of the private
key will be able to read the contents of the message.9' Furthermore,
the private key can be used to encrypt a message that the public key
can be used to decrypt. This use of the keys permits a holder of the
public key to be certain that a message came from no source other than
a holder of the private key corresponding to the public key used to
decrypt the message.93
One disadvantage of public key cryptography compared with
symmetric key cryptography is that the process of encryption is more
computationally intensive because of the complex mathematical
algorithms necessary to produce the asymmetric keys. As a result,
public key cryptography is not well suited for encrypting large
messages. However, in cases where the contents of a message do not
require a high degree of confidentiality but an authentication is needed,
public key cryptography can be used to produce a "digital signature"
that assures the recipient of the authenticity of the message and the
integrity of the contents, without the guaranteed confidentiality of the
text of the message.94
While public key cryptography solves the problem of key
distribution because the public key can be published widely and
distributed freely without compromising the security of the private
91. See GARFiNKEL& SPAFFORD, supra note 35, at 187-208.
92. See id
93. See id
94. In order to create a digital signature with public key cryptography, a message
digest or message hash must first be produced that represents the text of the message to be
signed. This is accomplished by running the entire contents of the message through a hash
function that produces a unique value that represents the entire message. The value, know as
a message digest or integrity check value, is unique to the message so that any change
whatsoever in the message text will produce a different value. The hash function should
work only one way, for a given message digest, so it is not possible to guess the text from
which it was generated.
A digital signature is produced by running the text to be signed through a hash function
and then using the private key of the signer to encrypt the message digest. The encrypted
digest is sent with the message to a recipient, who is already in possession of the signer's
public key. The recipient runs the message through the same hash function to produce a
message digest independently and then decrypts the message digest from the sender and
compares the two. If the two message digests are identical, the recipient of the message can
feel confident both that the message originated from the owner of the private key and that it
has not been altered in transit.
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key, significant key management problems remain. The most obvious
is that the private key must remain confidential to prevent its
unauthorized use. Equally onerous is the problem of determining
whether a public key is really associated with the person who claims to
be its owner.95 Until a reliable, inexpensive key distribution system
that facilitates identification of the private key holder is created, public
key cryptography will probably not be very useful in electronic
commerce applications.
The problem of reliable public key distribution could be solved
by creating a "public key infrastructure." One model of a public key
infrastructure is the "web of trust" idea, a popular public key
encryption program.96 In building a web of trust, each person may
either certify the validity of a key or rely on another trusted party to
certify the validity of a key.97 As more people join the web of trust, the
keys of people within the web will be certified by more and more
other members of the web, building the trustworthiness of the
association between any given public key and the real person who
claims to be using it. This model works for loosely interacting
communities, such as individuals seeking to protect the confidentiality
of their e-mail communications. 98 However, the system is not well
suited to the needs of electronic commerce, because determining
whether to accept an electronic signature encrypted with a PGP public
key requires knowledge of at least one of the certifying parties.

95. For example, anyone with the appropriate software loaded on his or her personal
computer could generate a public key, post it on the Internet, and announce that it is Bill
Gates' public key. Before someone wishing to communicate with Bill Gates in confidence
will be willing to use that public key to encrypt a message to be sent to his e-mail address, the
sender would want some assurance that the public key labeled as Bill Gates' key was indeed
his and not that of an impostor. One solution is to meet with Bill Gates in person and
exchange public keys on floppy disks, but the expense of this type of security procedure
destroys most of the advantages of public key (rather than symmetric key) cryptography.
96. PGP is a freeware program written by Phil Zimmerman that incorporates
patented technology licensed from RSA Data Security, Inc. Zimmerman wrote the program
because he believed that the privacy rights of citizens were at risk without access to public
key cryptography. See GARFINKEL, supra note 83, at 235-36. In its early days, PGP was
surrounded by controversy regarding possible patent infringements and violations of
prohibitions on exports of cryptography, but these issues have now been resolved. See id.
PGP can be downloaded without charge for noncommercial use by U.S. or Canadian citizens
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology web server at <http://web.mit.edu/network/
pgp.html> (visited Jan. 20, 1998). In addition, Counsel Connect, Inc. is offering its members
PGP encryption with e-mail services. See PGP5. Secured Messages at a Click of a Mouse, 6
LAW OFFICETECH. REv. 93 (Oct. 29, 1997).
97. See GARFINKEL, supra note 83, at 235-36.
98.
See WARICK FORD & MICHAEL BAUM, SECURE EL.ECTRONIC COMMERCE:
BUILDING THE INFRA STRUCTURE FOR DiGrrAL SIGNATURES AND ENCRYPTION 277 (1997).
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Otherwise, there is no way to be sure that all of the certifying parties
are not really all the same person trying to perpetrate a fraud.
A more common public key infrastructure involves the use of a
certification authority. A certification authority is a trusted third party
who is in the business of associating a public key with a particular
individual. 99 The certification authority associates an individual with a
public key by issuing a certificate that at a minimum contains a copy
of the public key in question and the identity of the person associated
with it. It may also include information about how long the certificate
will be valid or special characteristics identifying the context in which
the public key will be used. The certification authority then signs the
certificate with its own digital signature."° In the ABA Digital
Signature guidelines, the party requesting the issuance of the
certificate is known as the "subscriber."' 1 1 The person using the
certificate to confirm the association between a public key and an
individual is a "relying party."' 02 Any relying party in possession of
the certification authority's public key and the subscriber's certificate
can now verify that a message has come from the subscriber of the
certificate.
This merely begs the question of how relying parties know that
they can trust the certification authority. Another certification
authority could be set up to certify the first certification authority, and
so on, but ultimately there will be a certification authority that is not
certified by any other, known as the root certification authority.'03
What kind of root certification authority will inspire the confidence
necessary to make digital signatures a viable authentication procedure
for electronic commerce applications remains to be seen. Utah, in
response to this perceived problem, enacted digital signature
legislation authorizing the state to act as the root certification authority
and providing
for the licensing of certification authorities by the
°4
state.
Building a public key infrastructure requires more than just a
credible certification authority issuing certificates. To enhance the
value of a certificate, a certification authority will need to provide a
99. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in
Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REV. 49, 55-56 (1996) [hereinafter Froonmkin, Essential
Role].
100. Seeikat58.
101. See INFORMATON SECuRrrY COMMIrrEE, supra note 2, at 63-64.
102. See id at 60.
103. See Froonkin, EssentialRole, supranote 99, at 56.
104. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-201 to 46-3-504 (1997) (Utah's Digital Signature
Law).
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mechanism for subscribers to notify the certification authority that the
security of the private key has been compromised and the certificate
must be canceled. A subscriber should also be able to request the
cancellation of a certificate if the subscriber has a policy of retiring key
pairs on a regular basis in conformity with sound security practices. In
addition, the certification authority will need a mechanism to revoke a
certificate if it learns after issue that it was procured by fraud on the
part of the subscriber. The certification authority will need to provide
a means for prospective relying parties to check whether a certificate is
still valid or has been revoked for these or any other reasons. The
simplest method for providing this information to prospective relying
parties is to create a "certificate revocation list." For a relying party to
establish that its reliance was in fact reasonable, it will have to first
check the certificate revocation list. If the certificate revocation list is
maintained online, the software that verifies digital signatures with
reference to certificates can be programmed to check the certificate
revocation list at the same time as the comparison of the keys is made
and to display an error message if the certificate shows up as revoked.
The certification authority will want to limit its possible exposure
to relying parties. One step towards achieving this goal is limiting the
operational period of the certificate to a finite period of time. The
certification authority may further limit the reasonable reliance of the
relying party by specifying limits to the application of the digital
signature in transactions. The most obvious reliance limit might be set
on the value of the transactions for which the relying party can
reasonably rely on the certificate. The policies governing the
acceptable use of certificates can be specified in the certificate, and the
software used by the various parties could be programmed to accept
or
15
reject certificates based on their compliance with certain policies. '
Certification authorities may establish different policies and
procedures for associating individual persons with online identities.
Certification practice statements that are disclosed to subscribers and
potential relying parties provide certification authorities with a
mechanism to explain the procedures that the certification authority
will use in reviewing certification applications and issuing certificates.
The certification authority may establish different classes of

105. The ITU X.509 Version 3 standard permits further qualifications to the use of the
certificate to be limited by the application of certain policies through the use of the Certificate
Policies extension field. See FORD & BAUM, supra note 98, at 283.
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certificates with different prices and
10 6 different degrees of scrutiny
applied in reviewing the application.
Even when digital signatures are used within a system that
includes a fully operational public key infrastructure, it is unclear
whether in practice such a system will meet the needs of parties to
online commercial transactions. An authentication procedure that
securely binds the operation of an encryption program located on a
specific machine with an online identity would not be as useful to a
prospective trading partner as an authentication procedure that binds a
human being that can be held legally accountable for his or her actions
to an online identity. The binding of a human being to the software
program that manages the digital signature technology is a problem
that has not yet been widely addressed, because most commercial
applications of digital signature technology were still in development
by early 1998.
PGP, a digital signature program that has been widely available in
one form or another since the late 1980s, uses a "pass phrase" as an
authentication procedure to grant access to the digital signature
program. A pass phrase may be longer than a password, such as the
standard eight character passwords used in UNIX operating systems,
and therefore may be harder to guess; however, any PIN, password, or
pass phrase remains susceptible to brute force attacks in which a
computer is programmed to try all possible combinations until it has
been guessed. If the password is stored in encrypted forms, the brute
force attack will take longer but is still possible if the attacker has
access to the encryption algorithm used to encrypt the password. If a
password is written out and found by the interloper, or is disclosed to
the interloper over the telephone in what the user thinks is a
conversation with a system administrator, a brute force attack is not
necessary.
The Counsel Connect online service for attorneys began making
PGP 5.0 available to its subscribers without additional charge in 1997.
This version of PGP used only an eight character password to
safeguard the private key. This digital signature program has a userfriendly interface designed to make encryption easier for users to add
to their e-mail messages sent from the Counsel Connect server, yet the
interface of this program provides limited guidance on maintaining the
106. See INFORMATION SEcuRrrYCOMMrrIE, supra note 2, at 37-38. In issuing Class
3 IDs, VeriSign ensures the applicant's identity and viability with inquiries to databases
maintained by Dun & Bradstreet, InterNIC, and other commercial establishments. See
Verisign Information Page (visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http://www.verisign.com/
about/idservices.html>.
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security of private keys to new users unfamiliar with the problems of
computer security. The key generation module of the program
contains virtually no information whatsoever on computer security
issues; the help module of the program provides some help if the user
knows enough to seek its guidance on how to protect private keys. 107
If, within a computer, the private key that generates the digital
signature is stored in the same location as the digital signature
application, then an interloper who has access to that location of the
password also has the ability to execute unauthorized digital
signatures. There are several methods by which an interloper might
gain access to a digital signature application without the legitimate
user's knowledge.10 Perhaps the most obvious is when a service
technician is given access to the computer. There also is the possibility
107. The version of the help program available for download on July 17, 1997,
provides the following guidance under the heading "Generate a Private and Public Key Pair"
and the subheading "Protecting Your Keys":
Once you have generated a key pair, it is wise to create a spare set and put them in
a safe place in case something happens to the originals. In fact, when you close the
PGP keys window after creating a new key pair, you are prompted to save a
backup copy.
Your private keys and your public keys are stored in separate keyring files,
which you can copy just like any other files to another location on your hard drive
or to a floppy disk. By default, the private keyring (secring.pgp) and the public
keyring (pubring.pgp) are stored along with the other program files in the PGP file
directory, but you can save your backups in any location you like.
When you specify that you want to save a backup copy of your keys, the
"Select Backup Destination" dialog box appears asking you to specify the location
of the private keyring file that is to be backed up.
Besides making backup copies of your keys, you should be especially
careful about where you store your private key. Even though your private key is
protected by a pass phrase that only you should know, it is possible that someone
could discover your pass phrase and then use your private key to decipher your email or forge your digital signature. For instance, somebody could look over your
shoulder and watch the keystrokes you enter or intercept them on the network or
even over the airwaves.
To prevent anyone who might happen to get hold of your pass phrase from
being able to use your private key, you should only store it on your own computer.
If your computer is attached to a network, you should also make sure that your
files are not automatically included in a system-wide backup where others might
gain access to your private key. Given the ease with which computers are
accessible over today's networks, if you are working with extremely sensitive
information, you may want to keep your private key on a floppy disk which you
can insert like an old fashioned key whenever you want to read or sign your private
mail.
PGP Help (visited July 17, 1997) <http://www.nai.con/download/default.asp>. Another
security precaution may include assigning a different name to private keyring files and then
storing that password somewhere other than in the default PGP file directory where it will not
be so easy to locate. The PGP KEYS Preferences dialog box can then be used to specify a
name and location for private and public key ring files.
108. Telephone interview with Cern Kaner, Ph.D., J.D. (July 22, 1997).
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of a "rogue applet"' 9 entering the user's computer through a network
connection. 1 Such a rogue applet might be programmed to copy
certain files and upload them to a remote location without the local
user's knowledge. In addition, software support companies are
developing technology that either captures large amounts of
information off the local user's computer and transmits it back to the
software support company's system or that permits the software
support company's system to take over the local user's machine
entirely.111
Uploading information about the local machine's
configuration will permit the support provider to diagnose and solve
problems more easily, which is a perfectly legitimate business
objective given the virtually infinite variety of different applications
and peripherals that might be part of the local user's system. However,
the programs that upload this information are not currently designed to
inform the local user what information is being uploaded; or to prevent
12
the transfer of information that the user might wish to protect.'
Similarly, applications that grant root access on the local computer to
the remote service organization do not have any mechanism for the
local user to review or stop the actions of the remote service
organization. Many of these security risks can be controlled by storing
the private key off the system; however, it is unclear whether this
prudential standard will be adopted by the developers of digital
signature applications.
Given the weaknesses inherent in any form of authentication
procedure, attention has been focused on developing systems that use
a combination of authentication procedures together to reduce the
probability of unauthorized use.
For example, a biometric
authentication procedure such as a fingerprint scan might be required
to access the application that generates the user's digital signature.
Likewise, a smartcard bearing a secret key can be used to encrypt a
password that is transmitted to a computer system through a card

109. This would be a miniature program written in either Microsoft's ActiveX
technology or the Java programming language.
110. This risk was demonstrated by a programmer in 1996 who wrote an ActiveX
control that would simply shut down the local machine. See GARFINKEL, supra note 83, at
77. This was designed to demonstrate without inflicting any harm what an ActiveX control
is capable of doing on a client computer. The programmer became embroiled in a dispute
with Microsoft and VeriSign over whether the ActiveX control was malicious, which resulted
in his "Authenticode" certificate being revoked. See idL; see also Richard Hombeck,
-EDI
FORUM 1997
111. See Cem Kaner, The Insecurity of the Digital Signature (Sept. 26, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
112. Seeid.
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reader." 3 The smart card then forms a sort of "firewall" to protect
against interlopers whose only point of access is within the computer
system trying to invoke the digital signature application. While such
combination authentication procedures may be more expensive to
implement than digital signature authentication procedures based on
may be more
software applications alone, the higher initial investment
114
than offset by an overall reduction in fraud losses.
D. How Will InternetAuthenticationProceduresBe Used?
Authentication procedures will be used in a wide variety of
contexts in Internet electronic commerce. For web sites that simply
disseminate information, no authentication procedures may be
required at all unless restrictions are to be placed on who may access
the information. In order to control access, password protections may
be placed on certain sites. However, in order to engage in Internet
commerce where parties enter binding contracts over the Internet,
passwords are an inadequate means of verifying identity.
The Internet can be used as a medium of communication between
parties who wish to enter into contracts. The parties themselves will
determine whether they are willing to rely only on information that is
provided through contacts over the Internet, or whether the Internet
will be used merely to supplement the current means of
communication in business transactions, such as telephone, mail, and
fax. Security arrangements will be least problematic where the parties
have a preexisting business relationship and are merely adding the
Internet as a new channel for communications. For these parties,
authentication procedures can be devised that build on existing
policies and procedures in much the same way that electronic data
interchange (EDI) trading partner agreements provide for
authentication procedures. 1 5 For parties wishing to solicit new
business over the Internet and enter into binding contracts with parties
known to them only through online contacts, security concerns are
dramatically greater and much harder to resolve.

113. See SUMMERS, supra note 38, at 349.
114. These tradeoffs involved in establishing policies to minimize losses are discussed
more fully in Part IV, infra.
115. See ABA Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, The Commercial Use of
Electronic DataInterchange-A Report, 45 Bus. LAW. 1645, 1650 (1990) [hereinafter ABA,
Commercial Use].
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EDI has been in use since the 1970s for business-to-business
communication. 116 Businesses that exchange information using paper
forms can design communication systems that permit the computers in
each business to exchange electronic messages in a format that can be
interpreted within each system. Data is communicated using
standardized formats that permit the messages to be sent in highly
condensed forms.1 17 The use of EDI in purchasing transactions
experienced exponential growth beginning in the 1980s as businesses
implemented "just-in-time" inventory systems. 1'8 EDI messages may
be communicated directly between the trading partners, or over
"value-added networks" (VANs) organized by service providers.
Despite the widespread use of EDI in some sectors of the economy,
such as manufacturing, many businesses have not adopted EDI
because of the effort and expense required to integrate EDI
communications systems with existing computer operations.!19 One of
the appeals of Internet electronic commerce is that the total cost of
adopting electronic contracting practices may be lower than the cost of
adopting EDI systems.
Many businesses are in the process of
integrating Internet access into their existing computer systems, for
example to build corporate "Intranets" that distribute information
within the organization and exclude public access or to build web sites
to advertise their services.' 2 ' The purchase price of Internet electronic
commerce systems that integrate hardware and software is falling
rapidly, while the cost of integrating those services into existing
information systems and maintaining them is falling as familiarity with
the Internet becomes122more widespread within business information
systems departments.
It is possible to lay out a spectrum of different types of
contractual transactions that might be entered into over the Internet,
arranged from those raising the least difficult security problems to
116. See ABA Electronic Messaging Services Task Force, Model Electronic Data
Interchange Trading PartnerAgreement and Commentary, 45 Bus. LAW. 1717, 1718 (1990)
[hereinafter ABA, Model Agreement].
117. See R. David Whitaker, Letters of Creditand ElectronicCommerce, 31 IDAHO L.
REV. 699,700-03 (1995).
118. Seeid.
119. See Christine Curtis, Keep an Eye on EDI, Even if You are not in the Fortune
1000, CoMM. WK., Dec. 16, 1996, at 31.

120. See Steve Lohr, Business to Business on the Internet; Companies Go on Line to
Trim Costs and Find Ways to Make Money, Too, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1997, at Dl.
121.

See BENJAMIN WRIGHT & JANE K. WmNN, THE LAW OF ELECrRONIC COMMERCE

§ 2.6.3 (3d ed. 1998).
122. See Jim Carr, Users Wade Through Electronic Commerce Market, INFOWORLD,
June 23, 1997, at 75.
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those raising the most difficult. The least difficult security problems
are raised in what are loosely labeled "closed" systems, the most
difficult in "open" systems. The contrast between open and closed
systems is not very helpful, however, as the factors differentiating the
approaches to Internet electronic commerce involve too many
variables to permit simple categorization into two groups. While there
is not yet a generally recognized taxonomy of Internet transaction
types, the following list of categories may be helpful for this
discussion. This list is merely intended to be suggestive of possible
business models for contracting over the Internet for goods and
services; it is not exhaustive, nor does it propose categories for sorting
out the different types of financial transactions over the Internet.
1.

Closed-Bilateral

In a closed-bilateral transaction, one party (such as a
governmental unit or a business with substantial bargaining power vis,t-vis its customers) agrees to accept electronic messages with legal
significance from parties who have agreed to follow the security
procedures announced by the governmental unit. Between private
parties, a closed-bilateral system might be established through the
negotiation of contracts (similar to EDI trading partner agreements)
that define the rights and obligations of the parties with regard to
standards governing all aspects of electronic communications between
them. 12 3 The benefit to the party that sets the standard is reduced
transaction costs; however, if many such units set up radically different
security schemes, then the cost to the customers of accommodating
many, inconsistent security schemes may be very substantial.
The Cisco Systems,
Inc. extranet site is an, example of a closed14
bilateral system.
After parties execute an "electronic commerce
enrollment agreement' in which the parties agree which individuals
are authorized by the purchaser to submit purchase orders to Cisco, the
party may engage in commerce with Cisco. Other terms and
conditions, including the security procedures to be used, are disclosed
in the contract.

123. See ABA, ModelAgreement, supranote 116, at 1718.
124. The Cisco web site is located at <http://www.cisco.com> (visited Jan. 20, 1998).
The site provides a wealth of general information about electronic commerce using Cisco
products and services; however, the "Electronic Commerce Enrollment Agreement" and
other pages related to on-line ordering of Cisco products are accessible only to parties who
have a preexisting relationship with Cisco. See id
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Closed-Bound Community

In a closed-bound community, a preexisting group such as a
trade association or industry group decides to move intragroup
communications online and designates a central organization to act as
administrator of the system. The group agrees upon a security
procedure that meets the needs of the members and that, once in place,
can be used for communications between any member of the group
without further preparation or clearance. The benefit to the members
that set the standard is that it may reduce transactions costs for
intragroup communications. However, if members belong to several
groups simultaneously because of varied business operations, then the
member organizations may incur substantial costs in accommodating
many inconsistent schemes established by each group.
3.

Closed-Subscription

In this type of system, a standard is established by a body
designated for the purpose, such as an industry consortium, that will
define a group that will implement the security procedures in the
standard before commencing communications online. The Secure
Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol developed by Visa and
MasterCard, currently being marketed around the world as a secure
Internet application for any type of bank or credit card, is an example
of a closed-subscription model.12 5 In 1997, the Secure Electronic
Transaction standard was still under development and was only in use
in pilot projects, but it is likely that the final Secure Electronic
Transaction standard will have some or all of the following
characteristics. The consumer will be able to use digital signature
technology to verify the merchant's identity and the merchant will be
able to use digital signature technology to verify the cardholder's
identity.126 Cardholders will be able to send purchase information
encrypted in a form readable only by the merchant operating the web
site, and to send credit card information encrypted in a form only
readable by the merchant's financial institution. The digital signature
process executed by the consumer will be used only with credit card
transactions, so any risk of unauthorized use of the digital signature
125. Visit the Visa and MasterCard Internet sites for more information on the Secure
Electronic Transaction standard: <http'//www.visa.com> or <http.//www.mastercard.com>
(visited Jan. 20, 1998).
126. See, e.g., Visa-Electronic Commerce, Secure Electronic Commerce, Visa web
site (visited Feb. 26, 1998) <http://www.visa.com/cgi-bin/vee/nt/ecomm/main.html>
(introducing users to the concept of Secure Electronic Commerce).
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will be subject to the limitations on cardholder liability for
unauthorized use of credit cards. 127 Any party wishing to join the
system may do so as a card issuer or bank for a merchant, as a
merchant, or as a card holder, provided that the party independently
meets the standards to join the credit card system. 128 Merchants will
also need to insure that their Internet sites conform to the published
Secure Electronic Transaction standard. 129 Currently, independent
software developers are creating electronic commerce applications that
incorporate the Secure Electronic Transaction standard.13°
4.

Open-Server Security

When parties with no prior contact off of the Internet decide to
enter into contracts for the purchase of goods or services, they may
choose to do so based merely on the exchange of unencrypted e-mail
messages. It seems unlikely that many businesses will be willing to
assume the risks entailed in this type of communication, although
some may be willing to do so after using an "out of band" or "back
channel" communication with the prospective purchaser or vendor,
such as a telephone call or fax. Internet electronic commerce
conducted today using the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol
developed by Netscape is an example of the open-server security
This is because it uses digital signature technology to
model.'
provide server side security but does not provide a mechanism to
identify the potential customer.
The Dell Computer web site is an example of a successful
application of the open-server security Internet electronic commerce
model. 132 Dell customers use SSL technology to secure the
transmission of credit card information to Dell in the following
manner. Most recent versions of Netscape or Microsoft's web browser
127. See Larry Loeb, The Stage Is SET, INTERNs WORLD, Aug. 1996, at 55.
128. See What is SET?, IBM web site (visited Mar. 19, 1998) <http//www.software.
ibmom/commercepayment/whatisset.htnd>.
129. See id
130. See id
131. The Secure Socket Layer was the subject of a March 1996 Netscape Internet
Developer Conference. The graphical presentations of that conference are available through the
Netscape web site and provide information on Netscape's conception of the SSL protocol. See
Netscape Internet Developer Conference Proceedings, Commerce and Security (visited Feb. 26,
1998) <http:/search.netscape.comnmsctdeveloper/conferencelproceedingsksl/mdex.htm>.
132. Dell's web site is located at <http://www.dell.corn> (visited Jan. 20, 1998). The
secure pages of the web site are discernible in Netscape or Microsoft when the broken key or
open lock in the lower left- or right-hand comer of the computer monitor image changes to an
unbroken key or closed lock. These pages can be accessed by following the instructions for
purchasing a computer.
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programs come with certain digital certificates installed for
certification authorities such as VeriSign, Inc.1 33 These preinstalled
certification authority digital certificates can be used to verify the
public key associated with the merchant's web server. When a
potential customer accesses a secure web site, the local client
downloads a copy of the server's digital certificate. Once the server's
public key certificate has been checked against the certificate of the
certification authority that issued the certificate, the server's public key
is used to encrypt a symmetric key that is sent to the server and used to
encrypt all subsequent communications between the visitor's site and
the server during that session. A symmetric key is used for encryption
rather than the server's public key, because symmetric encryption is
less computationally intensive and therefore quicker for the average
personal computer to perform without degrading the web server's
response time to such a degree that a potential customer would be
unwilling to complete the transaction.134 The secure socket layer
protocol does not address what type of data is transmitted between the
client and server, although it is widely used to transmit credit card
information. 135 Adding the requirement that purchases be made using
credit cards provides merchants using secure socket layer security with
a way to qualify prospective customers independent of Internet
security.
Commercial Internet sites are not the only ones taking advantage
of this technology.
For example, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts Registry of Motor Vehicles permits motor vehicle
registration renewals and traffic citations to be paid at its Internet site
by credit card using Secure Socket Layer. 136 Also, the University of
Texas at Austin accepts applications for admissions online and allows

133. VeriSign is a spinoff of RSA Data Encryption, Inc., the holder of the RSA patent
for public key encryption (the patent was granted to Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adelman, former MIT professors). See GARFINKEL, supra note 83, at 1,35. VeriSign was the
largest commercial certification authority doing business in the United States, with various
information on their services available on their central web site. See VeriSign Web Site
(visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http://www.verisign.com>. Certificates can be viewed in a web
browser under a menu entry for "security preferences" under the "options" menu tab
(Netscape Navigator 3.0) or "security information" under the "communicator" menu tab
(Netscape Communicator 4.0).
134. See WRIGHT & WINN, supra note 121, § 3.6.5.
135. See id
136. See Registry of Motor Vehicles Express Lane (visited Jan. 20, 1998)
<http:llwww.magnet.state.ma.uslrmv/expressl>.
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graduates
to register with alumni relations online through secure web
37
sites.
5.

Open-Client Security

This category includes applications that require the client, or local
user, as well as the web server, to have its own digital signature, and
might also be known as the global stranger-to-stranger model of
Internet electronic commerce.
In discussions of public key
infrastructure that refer to something like the open-client security
model, it is generally assumed that the role of the certification
authority will be limited to binding the real world identity of a signer
with an online identity.138 The degree of scrutiny applied to perform
this binding function would be spelled out in the certification
authority's certification practice statement. This type of transaction
will occur when one party will be able to locate a prospective trading
partner from only information gleaned online and proceed to enter into
a binding contract online with no "out of band" or "back channel"
communication, all within a system secured by a global public key
infrastructure. This does not yet exist in practice, and even among
those who believe that this model will ultimately dominate online
commercial activity there 1is39 no consensus regarding how long it will
take to achieve in practice.
Many participants and observers of Internet electronic commerce
developments believe that, if technical and legal standards governing
certification authorities and the rights and responsibilities of
subscribers and relying parties can be agreed upon by the relevant
businesses and government agencies, global stranger-to-stranger
Internet electronic commerce will become a reality in the foreseeable
future. 140 Proponents of this open-client security model believe that,
through the use of technical and legal standards, a system can be built
that permits parties to verify signatures through certification authorities
with whom they have not dealt on any prior occasion.14 1 Certification
authorities and relying parties will be able to establish quickly and
137. See Secure Membership Sign-Up (last modified May 23, 1997)
<http://www.utexas.edu/alumni/Forms/secureAnnual.htm>.
138. One example of an Internet discussion group concerned with public key
infrastructure issues is the "digsig" listserv owned by Professor Amy Boss of Temple
University School of Law, begun in July 1997.
The archives are available at
<http://listserv.temple.edu/archives/digsig/htm>.
139. See Public Key Infrastructure Symposium, JuRzrmncs (forthcoming 1998).
140. See generallyFORD & BAUM, supra note 98 (discussing the perceived future of
Internet commerce).
141. Seei. at 309-10.
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easily the reliability of certificates issued by remote certification
authorities. 42 This model presents the largest technical and theoretical
challenges to designing a secure electronic commerce system, because
it requires uniformly agreed-to policies and procedures that ensure the
interoperability of systems designed by different vendors and the
continued expansion of the system to include an indefinitely large
number of participants.
Other observers are more dubious. One information technology
specialist within the financial services industry compared the
development of public key cryptography and the idea of a public key
infrastructure to the development of the internal combustion engine
and macadam as a road building material. 43 While the tools may now
be at hand to begin building a global infrastructure for stranger-tostranger commerce, the gap between recognition of the significance of
public key cryptography and actually completing the construction of
that global marketplace is immeasurable.
All parties involved agree
that the information technology infrastructure necessary to support
global Internet commerce between strangers will be considerable, and
at present there is no way to know whether the optimistic or the
pessimistic assessments of the time and investment required to achieve
it are more accurate.' 45
In early discussions of the design of open Internet electronic
commerce models, there was discussion of the idea of a "universal
certification authority" that would bind the identity of a person to an
online identity for all purposes.1 6 The appeal of this idea is that
individuals would not be burdened with remembering dozens of
different passwords or carrying around dozens of different tokens to
establish their online identity. 47 This idea was soon recognized as
being too simplistic for several reasons. First, persons in the United
States do not possess identity cards for purposes unrelated to online
transactions, so the idea of establishing the online equivalent of
national identity cards would be expected to meet with stiff opposition
from civil liberties activists. It is also unclear whether individuals
would actually feel overly burdened by using different authentication
procedures for different types of online transactions, given that most
142. See id at 290.
143. E-mail from Dwight Arthur, Managing Director Systems, National Securities
Clearing Corporation (July 1, 1997) (on file with author).
144. See id
145. See FORD & BAuM, supra note 98, at 309-10.
146. See WRIGHT, supra note 8, § 1.2.5.
147. See id.
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people use a variety of different authentication procedures today.14
Second, the certification authority would have the responsibility of
establishing the identity of a natural person for all legal and business
purposes.149 Companies likely to provide certification authority
services are technology companies, not private investigators or even
credit reporting services. Given the lack of a system of national
identity cards, it is unclear what would constitute due diligence by a
certification authority in establishing the identity of a person. As a
result of these uncertainties, businesses interested in entering the
certification150 authority market withdrew from the idea of a universal
certificate.
6.

Closed-Robust Local Administration

One way to reduce the administrative complexity of the openclient security model would be to delegate certain functions from the
central certification authority to local registration authorities. The
central certification authority functions might be limited to
maintaining the certificate revocation list and issuing certificates in
response to requests from local registration authorities. The functions
of the local registration authority may be defined by the participants in
the closed system-they may provide only the narrow range of
services included in the standard model of the central certification
authority, or they may provide a more "robust" service. The realworld connection between the local registration authorities and the
local business environment in which potential subscribers operate may
make it possible for the local registration authority to offer more robust
screening services at a price that participants in the system are willing
to pay. Important business services that a local registration authority
may be able to provide beyond identification include credit checking
and more rigorous background checks to support the association of a
person with an online identity.

148. See id.
149. See id.
150. The U.S. Postal Service was an early contender for the role of universal CA, but
has apparently lost interest in the project. In 1996, Cylink Corporation was part of a widely
publicized project with the United States Postal Service to establish a USPS certificate
authority.
In 1998, there was no information on either the Cylink web site
(<http://www.cylink-com>) or the USPS web site (<http://www.usps.gov>) reporting on the
status of the project, which is apparently dead. In 1997, industry observers expressed
skepticism regarding the likely success of the Post Office's electronic commerce initiative.
See Christy Hugdins-Bonafield, PostmarkMisses the Mark, NErWORK COMPUTING, Apr. 1,

1997, at 60.
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The OASIS (Open Access Same-Time Information System)
Internet site is an example of a closed-local administration model."'
In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission mandated that
electric power utilities participate in a nationwide trading system for
electric 1,ower to be established on the Internet. In 1997, OASIS came
online.1 2 Eight out of twelve of the regional power pools appointed
Tradewave, a technology vendor, to act as certification authority with
regional power pools153 or individual companies acting as local
registration authorities.
II

WHAT IS THE ELECTRONIC EQUIVALENT OFA SIGNATURE FOR

INTERNET COMMERCE?

Whenever one party claims rights under a signed agreement, it is
always possible that the party seeking to avoid liability will deny the
validity of the signature. This issue arises in many contexts, and the
legal doctrines addressing this problem vary depending on the specific
context within which the agreement arose. The elements required to
establish a binding obligation and the allocation of losses due to
forgery or other fraud vary depending on the business and social
context in which the agreement arises. The law must address not only
the problem of malfeasance by forgers or other impostors, but also the
problem of parties wrongfully repudiating their own undertakings.
A.

Common Law of Signatures

1.

What Is a Signature?

A signature is any mark or symbol affixed to a writing to
manifest the signer's intent to adopt it as his or her own and to be
bound by it.154 It need not be the full name of the signer placed at the
end of the text 15 -it may appear at any place on the document,156 and
it may be any mark, 5 the signer's initials, 5 8 or simply an
151. See OASIS Web Site (last modified Dec. 19, 1997) <http://www.tsin.com>.
152. The mandate to establish OASIS is FERC Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540
(1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 & 135).
153. See Alexander J. Cavalli & Jane K. Winn, Internet Security in the Electric Utility
Industry, JURIMEMRrCS (forthcoming 1998).
154. See Just Pants v. Wagner, 617 N.E.2d 246, 251 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
155. "Subscription" is the act of signing in writing at the bottom or end of a writing.
See Lawson v. Dawson's Estate, 53 S.W. 64,65 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
156. See State v. Morris, 223 So. 2d 743,745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
157. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 505 F Supp. 1190, 1224-25
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that stamp from Japanese "chop" or signature seal may constitute a
signature).
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identification number.159 It need not be handwritten-it may be
typewritten, 160 made with a rubber stamp, 161 printed, 162 lithographed
or engraved, 163 or made with a signature facsimile machine. 1 There
165
is no requirement that a signature be witnessed to be effective.
Unless a contract is required by statute to be in writing, it need not be
signed to be valid. 166 If there is no signature, then the party seeking to
establish that a contract exists will need to show that the parties167by
some other means manifested their intent to be bound by its terms.
The party to be bound by the signature need not personally
execute the signature. 16s The person intending to be bound may
delegate the act of signing to another person. 169 Even if there is no
formal agreement between the parties, principles of agency law may
determine whether the person signing on behalf of another acted
70
pursuant to a valid grant of authority, whether express or implied.1
Express authority "is [manifested fully and specifically] to the
agent,"'171 while implied authority is a natural consequence of the
express authority granted by the principal to the agent and must be
consistent with that express grant.17
For example, the express
designation of an individual to act as a manager of an enterprise
includes the implied authority to carry out all normal operative
functions of the enterprise. 173 If the authority to sign for another has
been granted, the principal's signature executed by the agent is binding

158. See United States v. Wexler, 657 F. Supp. 966, 971 (E.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd on
othergrounds, 838 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988).
159. See People v. Zavulunov, 629 N.Y.S.2d 934,936 (Crim. Ct. 1995).
160. See Mohawk Airlines, Inc. v. Peach, 365 N.YS.2d 331,338 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
161. See Parshalle v. Roy, 567 A.2d 19, 27 (Del. Ch. 1989).
162. See Cama v. Bessemer Cement Co., 558 F Supp. 706,708 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
163. See Maricopa County v. Osbom, 136 P.2d 270,274 (Ariz. 1943).
164. See infra text accompanying notes 179-182 for a discussion of the use of
facsimile signature machines for private contracts. Many states have adopted the Uniform
Facsimile Signatures of Public Officials Act to resolve any issues associated witb the official
use of facsimile signatures in connection with the issuance of public securities or payment
instruments. See UNIFORM FACSPAILE SIGNATURES OF PUBLIC OFFICALS Acr § 2 (1997).
165. See Pee Dee Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Joye, 326 S.E.2d 650, 653 (S.C. 1984).
166. See Swope Alabaster Supply v. City of Alabaster, 514 So. 2d 927, 929 (Ala.
1987).
167. See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Ralph Chapek, Inc., 838 E2d 989, 924 (3d Cir.
1987).
168. See Coppell Bank v. Smith, 742 S.W.2d 454,460 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
169. See Spicer v. Colonial Penn Life Ins. Co., 449 S.W.2d. 704,705 (Ark. 1970).
170. See Bullis v. Bear, Steams & Co., 553 N.W.2d 599,602 (Iowa 1996).
171. HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WnjiAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY &
PARrNERSHP 37 (2d ed. 1990).
172. Seeid. at42.
173. Seeid_ at43.
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on the principal just as though the principal herself signed. 74 If the
agent exceeds the scope of his authority, the signature may
nevertheless be binding if the act is within the apparent or ostensible
authority of the agent.
If a third party in good faith believes the
agent to be acting within the scope of his or her authority because of
the behavior of the principal, then the principal will be estopped from
later disputing the agent's authority. 17 6 A signature made by an agent
without any authority may nevertheless be effective as the signature of
the principal if the principal later accepts the benefits that accrue as a
result of the signature. 77 Ratification is the subsequent
affirmance of
178
an act originally done by the agent without authority.
2.

When Can a Signature Machine Produce a Valid and Binding
Signature?

A signature may be executed through the use of a facsimile
signature device. 179 Even though an unauthorized signature produced
with a signature machine may be identical in appearance to a genuine
signature, it is without effect unless it can be shown that the signature
was made by someone with apparent authority or that the purported
signer has ratified it.180 Given the difficulty of establishing who was
operating the machine that produced a facsimile signature, it is
common for parties receiving them to require an agreement from the
owner of the machine that the owner will not deny the validity of any
signatures made with the machine. 18' This is because, in the absence
of such an agreement, the party relying on the validity of the signature
may have to establish the circumstances
under which the facsimile
82
signature device was in fact used.

174. See id. at 57.
175. See id.
176. See id at 58.
177. See id. at 65-66.
178. See id. at 72-73.
179. See State v. Hickman, 189 So. 2d 254,258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
180. See Daniels v. Stovall, 660 . Supp. 301,303 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
181. See RAYMOND NATrER ET AL, 1 BANKING LAW § 9.02[4] (1992). Such an
agreement was upheld in Perini Corp. v. First Nat7 Bank of Habersham County, 553 F.2d
398, 420 (5th Cir. 1977). But cf. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. Girard Bank, 522 F Supp. 414,
420-21 (E.D. Pa 1981) (refusing to honor an agreement in which the defendant bank would
escape liability). The holding in Cumis is criticized in BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK
DEposrrs, COLLErONS AND CREDrr CARDs I 2.01 [2][c][iii] (3d ed. 1990).
182. See infra text accompanying notes 237-274 for a discussion of commercially
reasonable security procedures under UCC Article 4A and a discussion of the same problem
as it arises in the electronic funds transfer context.
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What Is the Significance of Notarizing a Signature?

Signatures made in the presence of a notary public may be
attested to by the notary.183 In witnessing or attesting a signature, the
notarial officer must deternine, either from personal knowledge or
from satisfactory evidence, that the signature is that of the person
appearing before the officer.184 The typical procedure for having a
notary attest to the validity of a signature is to have the person whose
signature is to be notarized appear before the notary with sufficient
evidence that the person is who he or she claims to be.18 The person
signs the document in the presence of the notary, and then the notary
formally witnesses the signature by affixing the notarial seal or stamp
and by signing and dating the document.' 865While the notary does not
insure the identity of the subscriber, the notary may nevertheless be
liable if he 87
or she acts negligently or recklessly in the conduct of his or
office.1
her
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that documents
accompanied by a certificate of acknowledgment executed by a notary
public do not require extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition
precedent to admissibility. 88 This is advantageous because it obviates
the need for testimony from witnesses or submission of other extrinsic
proof to demonstrate the authenticity of a proffered piece of
evidence. 89 The rule does not address the persuasiveness of the
evidence, nor its relevance, nor does it create any presumption as to
the accuracy of the proffered document.' 90 The justification for this
form of authentication is that the person whose name is on the

183. A notary public is a public official authorized to perform many functions in
addition to witnessing signatures, including taking an acknowledgment, administering an
oath or affirmation, taking a verification upon an oath or affirmation, certifying or attesting a
copy, and noting a protest of a negotiable instrument. See UNIFORM LAW ON NOTARIAL ACTS
§ 1 (1997) (defining a "notarial act."). The law governing notaries is largely state law. Most
states regulate notaries by statute; many states have adopted the Uniform Law on Notarial
Acts approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1983. See Michael L. Closen & G. Grant Dixon, III, Notaries Publicfrom the ime of the
Roman Empire to the United States Today and Tomorrow, 68 N.D. L. Rev. 873, 876-77

(1992).
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
EVIDENCE
190.

See UNIFORM LAw ON NOTARIAL ACTs § 2.
Seeid
See Closen & Dixon, supra note 183, at 883-84.
See id at 888-89.
See FED. R. EviD. 902(8).
See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
§ 902.02[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
See id § 902.02[3].
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document must have come before the notary and proved his or her
identity.191
4.

What Is a Signature in Electronic Commerce?

While the popular understanding of signature might limit the
concept to handwritten or even cursive autographs affixed to paper at
the conclusion of the authenticated text that the signer is
authenticating, it is clear that the legal definition of signature is much
more flexible. In theory, courts should have no problem adapting the
legal definition of any mark or symbol made with the intention of
authenticating a text to the online environment where the text may
consist of a computer record and the signature may consist of a typed
name at the bottom of an electronic mall message. In practice, most
courts faced with the question have in fact responded by looking to the
intent of the purported signer and the evidence provided by the parties
regarding the context in which the alleged signature was made. 92 As
long ago as 1869, a New Hampshire court upheld the validity of a
contract formed by the exchange of telegrams under a statute of frauds
requiring a signed writing. 193 As recently as 1996, however, a Georgia
court held that a fax did not constitute a written notice because it was
only "chirps and beeps."' 94 Thus, while most courts have looked
beyond the technology in use to consider the evidence of the parties'
intentions and the circumstances of the transaction, including the
reliability of the computer procedures involved, it is not certain that all
courts will act accordingly.
In order to eliminate any risk that a court might deem that the
exchange of electronic messages fails to meet the writing and
signature requirements of a statute of frauds, EDI trading parties often
enter into written trading partner agreements. 95 These agreements can
provide that, for the purposes of the parties, the exchange of certain
electronic messages will give rise to a valid and binding contract for
the sale of goods.' 96 The trading partner agreement meets any legal
requirement that a contract be signed and establishes the framework
within which the parties attach legal significance to different forms of

191. See id- § 902.10[1].
192. See WRiGHT & WINN,supra note 121, at 16-17.
193. See Howley v. Whipple, 48 N.H. 487,488 (1869).
194. Department of Transp. v. Norris, 474 S.E.2d 216, 218 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996), rev'd
on other grounds,486 S.E. 2d 826 (Ga. 1997).
195. See ABA, ModelAgreement, supranote 116, at 1657-58.
196. See id.
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electronic communications." 9 Written trading partner agreements can
also include express provisions that allocate the risk of losses arising
through unauthorized access to the network or failure to maintain the
level of communication or system security agreed upon by the parties.
B.

NegotiableInstruments Law

Negotiable instruments are a special category of contracts that
originated within the merchant community of western Europe in the
early modem era. 9 Negotiable instruments law developed in the
succeeding centuries as a body of formal doctrines in England as
merchants brought their disputes to the royal courts for resolution. 199
As a result of this venerable provenance, many of the principal tenants
of negotiable instruments law differ markedly from those of general
contract law. In particular, certain doctrines of negotiable instruments
law emphasize the importance of form to a much greater degree than is
characteristic of modem contract law.20 0 As a result, holders of
negotiable instruments seeking to recover from the instrument's maker
enjoy the benefit of certain liability rules and evidentiary presumptions
that make it easier for the holder to recover than would be the case in
an action on a general contractual obligation. 20 1 As a result of these
liability rules and evidentiary presumptions, the possibility increases
that someone who is not in fact the maker of a negotiable instrument
will nevertheless be held liable to pay the amount of the instrument.
The formalism of negotiable instruments law and the apparent
harshness of the results that it produces for the purported signer in
certain cases contrasts with the common law emphasis on the intent of
the signer as the decisive element distinguishing a signature from a
mere autograph or a forgery. Negotiable instruments law had its
197. See id
198. See JAMES STEVEN ROGERS, THE EARLY HISTORY OFTHE LAW OFBILLS AND NOTES

32(1995).
199. See id at 12.
200. Contemporaneous with the development of negotiable instruments law in the law
of merchants were the common law forms of action for covenant under seal and debt. These
forms of action were characterized by a high degree of formalism. See J.H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCrION To ENGLISH LEGALHISTORY 326 (3d ed. 1990). Covenant under seal and debt
were eventually supplanted by the more flexible form of action for trespass on the case in
assumpsit, which became the foundation of modem contract law in the 19th century with the
abolition of the forms of action. See id.
201. One noteworthy liability rule that applies in negotiable instruments law but not in
general contract law is the rule that a holder in due course can enforce an instrument without
regard to many competing claims of ownership or defenses to the payment obligation. See
U.C.C. § 3-305(b) (1996). The relevance of holder in due course doctrines to electronic
commerce are beyond the scope of this Article.
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origins in the medieval law of merchants, and in the need of parties in
commerce to effect payment for goods in the absence of modem
banking and payment systems. 202 In order to make the merchant's
written obligations more acceptable, the terms of the obligations and
the procedures for their assignment or negotiation became very
stylized and formalistic. 20 3 While the rigidity of these rules can
operate as a trap for unwary parties,2 04 to the extent that negotiable
instrument doctrines are a reflection of commercial custom and
negotiable instruments primarily circulate among merchants who are
familiar with those customs, the formalism and rigidity of negotiable
instruments 2°law
5 helps to create an efficient, decentralized payment
mechanism.
1.

What Is a*Signature?

Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the use of the term
"signed [is defined to] include[] any symbol executed or adopted by a
party with present intention to authenticate a writing.' 206 Official
Comment 39 adds that "authentication" is included in the definition to
make clear that a complete signature is not necessary.207 Rather,
authentication may be printed, stamped, or written; it may be merely
initials or a thumbprint, or even in appropriate cases found on the
letterhead of a writing. 208 The comment emphasizes that the
determinative element is the present intent of the signer to authenticate
the writing that creates a signature, so common sense and commercial
experience must be used to decide hard cases.
202. See ROBERT BRAUCHER & ROBERT A. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS 146 (1977).

203. See Ronald J. Mann, Searchingfor Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems,
44 UCLA L. REV. 951,957-58 (1997).
204. See MORTON I. HORwrrz, THm TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
219 (1977) (describing popular resistance to the spread of the doctrine of negotiability from

drafts to promissory notes in the early 19th century).
205. While it might have this effect in theory, many authors have questioned the
continued relevance of the concept of negotiability in modem commercial law. See Grant
Gilmore, Formalismand the Law ofNegotiableInstruments, 13 CREIGtrON L. REV. 441, 461
(1979); Mann, supra note 203, at 956; James Steven Rogers, The Irrelevanceof Negotiable
Instrument Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based Payment System, 65 TEx. L. REv. 929,

920-31 (1987); Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability-WhoNeeds It?, 71 COLUM. L. REv.375,
379 (1971); see also Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model or
Transfer and Pledge of Interests in Securities Controlledby Intermediaries, 12 CARDOzo L.
REV. 305, 398-402 (1990) (suggesting that the traditional model of transfer rights and
negotiability poorly fits modem commercial practices).
206. U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1996).
207. See id § 1-201, Official Comment 39.
208. See id
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Within UCC Article 3, more specific provisions govern the
validity of signatures on negotiable instruments. The basic rule is that
no one is liable on an instrument unless that person signed the
instrument or the instrument was signed by that person's agent or
representative. 2° 9 However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions
discussed below. 2 1° In addition, Article 3 expressly provides that a
signature may be made either manually or by means of a machine, by
the use of any name including a trade name or assumed name, or by
any word, mark, or symbol adopted by a person with the present intent
to authenticate a writing.211 With regard to signatures by authorized
representatives that are binding on the represented persons, the default
2 12
rule in Article 3 is that common law rules of agency law apply.
Article 3 also includes special provisions governing the effect of
signatures by representatives, such as officers of corporations that sign
checks issued by corporations, and other common problems involving
authorized representatives that arise in modem commercial
transactions. 3 In addition, a signature that was
214 unauthorized when
fact.
the
after
ratified
be
nevertheless
may
made
2.

When Can a Party Be Held Liable for a Signature He or She Did
Not Produce?

The general rule of negotiable instruments law is that a party
cannot be liable on an instrument that he or she did not sign.21 ' A
forged signature, because it is ineffective as the signature of the
purported signer, operates instead as the signature of the forger. 1 6
However, Article 3 provides for several circumstances under which
the purported signer will be precluded from avoiding liability for a
forged signature. 217 With regard to the signature of a maker or drawer
of an instrument, this includes situations where the purported signer
has substantially contributed to the making of a forged signature

209. See id § 3-401(a).
210. See infra notes 215-223 and accompanying text.
211. See U.C.C. §3-401(b).
212. See id § 3-402(a), Official Comment 1.
213. See id § 3-402(b), §3-402(c), Official Comment 2, Official Comment 3.
214. See id. § 3-403(a), Official Comment 3.
215. See id § 3-401(a).
216. See id.§ 3-403(a), Official Comment 2.
217. In addition, a purported signer may be precluded from avoiding liability for a
forged signature based on the common law doctrine of estoppel, which supplements the
UCC. See id) § 1-103. Also, a bank customer who fails to examine his or her bank statement
may be precluded from demanding that the bank recredit the account after the bank has paid
on a check with a forged signature. See id. § 4-406.
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through his or her failure to exercise ordinary care.218 The Official
Comments provide examples of the type of negligence that can be the
basis of preclusion under UCC § 3-406(a), such as failure of an
employer to safeguard a rubber signature stamp that is then used by an
employee fraudulently to sign checks.219
The party whose negligence contributed to the forger is liable
only to certain persons for the amount of the instrument. These
include those who in good faith pay the instrument (in the case of a
check, this would include the bank on which the check was drawn) or
those who in good faith take the instrument for value (in the case of a
check, this would include a third party such as a merchant who paid
the forger for the check).220 In the event that the party paying or taking
the instrument for value was also negligent, the 1989 revisions of
Article 3 created a comparative negligence standard for allocating the
loss due to the forgery between the purported signer and the party that
paid or gave value for the instrument.2n The revisions substituted the
comparative negligence standard for the contributory negligence
standard embodied in the prior version of Article 3.222 The former rule
provided that any person who by his or her negligence substantially
contributes to the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded
from asserting that lack of authority against a holder in due course or
someone who in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards pays or gives value for the instrument.2
3.

When Is a Signature Presumed To Be Authentic?

Some of the primary advantages of evidencing obligations in the
form of negotiable instruments rather than simply as agreements
subject to the general law of contracts are the significant procedural
advantages that plaintiffs enjoy while seeking to recover in litigation
218. See id § 3-406(a). With regard to a forged indorsement on an instrument, these
include instances where someone has made a check payable to an imposter or fictitious payee
or has permitted an employee to make a fraudulent indorsement. See id § 3-404, § 3-405.
Because it is unclear what would constitute an indorsement for the purposes of electronic
commerce, these liability rles are beyond the scope of this Article. It is unclear whether the
alteration of an electronic record containing a payment obligation is a practical or theoretical
risk in electronic commerce.
219. See id § 3-406, Official Comment 3.
220. See id § 3406(a).
221. See id § 3-406(b). The burden of proving failure to exercise ordinary care in
connection with the making of the signature is on the party asserting the preclusion, whereas
the burden of proving failure to exercise ordinary care in paying or taking the instrument for
value is on the person precluded from asserting the forgery. See id § 3406(c).
222. See id § 3406.
223. See idl § 3406, Official Comment 2.
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based on negotiable instruments. 224 These procedural advantages may
permit the plaintiff to reduce the obligation to a judgment and to
proceed to execution on the judgment much more quickly than would
be possible in litigation on contracts generally. These procedural
advantages may flow from the provisions of the UCC,'2 5 from state
law outside the UCC,226 or from the rules of evidence.? 7
UCC Article 3 provides that, unless specifically denied in the
pleadings, each signature on an instrument is admitted. 2 8 This
simplifies the plaintiff's task in proving his or her case and requires the
defendant to put the plaintiff on notice at the outset of the litigation
that the validity of a signature will be at issue. 229 When the validity of
a signature is put in issue, the party claiming under the signature has
the burden of establishing it, but she enjoys the benefit of a
presumption that the signature is genuine or authorized.230 A mere
denial of the signature's genuineness is normally insufficient to
overcome this presumption; the party seeking to avoid liability must
introduce some evidence to support a finding that the signature is a
forgery.23 1 If enough evidence is introduced by the defendant to
overcome the presumption, however, the plaintiff must prove that it is
more probable than not that the signature is genuine or authorized.232
Some states provide similar procedural advantages for holders of
instruments outside of UCC Article 3. For example, the New York
Civil Practice and Remedies Code has a procedure designed to permit
actions based on an instrument for the payment of money only to be
started with a motion for summary judgment. 233 This procedure is
used primarily in cases dealing with commercial paper, whether or not
it complies with all of the technical requirements of negotiable
instruments law. 34

224. See LARRY LAWRENCE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYMENT SYSTEMS 215 (1997).
225. See infra notes 228-232 and accompanying text.

226. See infra notes 233-234 and accompanying text.
227. See infra notes 235-236 and accompanying text.

228. See U.C.C. § 3-308(a).
229. See icL § 3-308, Official Comment 1.

230. See id. § 3-308(a). However, where the purported signer is dead or has become
incompetent before the time of the litigation, there is no presumption of authenticity. See id.

231. See Bates & Springer, Inc. v. Stallworth, 382 N.E.2d 1179, 1185-87 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1978).
232. See LAWRENCE, supra note 224, at 216.

233. See N.Y C.P.L.R. 3213 (McKinney 1997) (motion for summary judgment in lieu
of complaint).
234. New York courts are strict in interpreting what is an "instrument for the payment

of money only." Interman Indus. Prod. Ltd. v. R.S.M. Electron Power, Inc., 371 N.Y.S.2d
675,679-80 (1975).
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The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that commercial paper,
signatures on commercial paper, and documents relating to
commercial paper are self-authenticating to the extent provided by
commercial law.235 This rule is designed to recognize the nationwide
implementation of the UCC and to allow its evidentiary presumptions
to govern in appropriate cases.236
C.

UCCArticle 4A and CommerciallyReasonableSecurity
Procedures

Although payment by checks constitutes the largest number of
transactions in the United States today, the largest volume of payments
based on amount is transferred through electronic funds transfer
systems. 237 Several funds transfer systems exist in the United States:
the Federal Reserve Banks maintain a wire transfer system known as
the Fedwire; 8 a group of commercial banks in New York maintains a
wire transfer system known as CHIPS (the Clearinghouse Interbank
Payments System);239 the National Automated Clearinghouse
Association (NACHA) represents a national network of automated
clearinghouses for funds transfers; 24° retail customers of banks make
electronic funds transfers using automated teller machines and home
banking services. 241 The daily volume of transfers over the two
wholesale funds transfer systems-Fedwire and CHIPS-usually
exceeds $1 trillion. 42
Prior to 1989 there was no comprehensive set of statutory or
regulatory rules governing the wholesale wire transfer system.
Applicable law was derived from the regulations and operating rules
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the
operating rule of private systems such as CHIPS, and common law
principles developed by analogy from the law of other payment
systems.243 With regard to many issues, however, this body of law was
sparse and underdeveloped. 2
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
235. See FED. R. EvID. 902(a).
236. See WEINsTIN & BERGER, supra note 189, § 902.1111].
237. See U.C.C. art. 4A, Prefatory Note (1996).
238. See id
239. See id
240. See WRIGHT & WINN, supranote 121, §1.03(2).
241. Consumer electronic funds transfers are discussed infra notes 295-318 and
accompanying text.
242. See U.C.C. art. 4A, Prefatory Note (1996).
243. Seeid
244. See BAKER & BRANDEL, supra note 7, 13.02.
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(NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) began the process
of proposing statutory rules to bridge this gap, first with an
unsuccessful proposal for a New Payment Code that would have
integrated and homogenized the law governing all types of payment
systems. 245 Following the abandonment of the New Payment Code in
1984, a drafting committee was set up with the narrower charge of
producing a law governing only wholesale wire transfers. 246 This
drafting committee produced UCC Article 4A, which was officially
promulgated by NCCUSL in 1990247 and which by 1997 had been
adopted in all fifty states.
The drafters of Article 4A were charged with developing a
statutory framework for a set of institutional arrangements that were
already well established before the arrival of the drafting committee on
the scene. Participants in the wholesale wire transfer system were
largely confined to major corporations and commercial banks, and
they were not only quite sophisticated in their understanding of the
wire transfer system but were also well represented at the drafting
committee meetings. 24 The drafters of Article 4A were able to forge
a consensus from the often sharply divergent notions of appropriate
liability regimes advocated by banks providing the wire transfer
2 49
services and their corporate customers who used those services.
In drafting a comprehensive statute to govern a commercial
practice that had been from its inception wholly within the realm of
electronic commerce, the drafters of Article 4A were forced to find
novel solutions for many of the problems of electronic commerce.
One of the most noteworthy innovations of Article 4A was the concept
of a "security procedure" as a means to authenticate payment orders
from bank customers to banks in lieu of a traditional signature. 250 One
of the loss allocation issues that the drafters confronted was the
245. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some
Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 743, 746
(1993).
246. See id
247. Seeid at780n.132.

248. See id at 763.
249. The issue of consequential damages for a bank's failure to execute a wire transfer
is one example. Although legal academics had long been persuaded of the need for formal
law to govern the wire transfer system, actual participants in the system were persuaded by
the Evra case. See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp. 673 E2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982). In Evra,
Judge Posner raised the specter of consequential damages for failure by a bank properly to
execute a wire transfer, which was not an acceptable risk for the banks operating the system.
See id at 958-59. Also, the UCC provides that a bank cannot be liable for consequential
damages to the extent provided by an express written agreement. See U.C.C. § 4A-305(a)
(1996).
250. See U.C.C. § 4A-201.
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problem of unauthorized payment orders, or the subsequent fraudulent
repudiation of a valid payment order.25 ' This problem is addressed in
Article 4A with the concept of a "commercially reasonable security
2
procedure."
1.

What Is a Commercially Reasonable Security Procedure?
A security procedure is defined in Article 4A as a procedure
"established by agreement of a customer and its receiving house for
the purpose of (i) either verifying that a payment order or other
communication ... that of the customer, or (ii) detecting error in the
transmission or the content of a payment order or communication."5 3
Article 4A does not set any formal rules regarding what may qualify as
a security procedure, other than to note that merely comparing a
signature on a payment order with an authorized specimen signature is
not by itself a security procedure2 4 A security procedure may require
the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers,
encryption, callback procedures, or similar security devices. 5
Just because a security procedure conforms -to UCC §4A-201
does not mean that it is a "commercially reasonable" security
procedure. What constitutes a commercially reasonable security
procedure is determined in light of the wishes of the bank's customer
that are expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the customer
known to the bank (including the size, type, and frequency of payment
orders normally issued by the customer to the bank), alternative
security procedures offered by the bank to the customer, and security
procedures in general use by customers and receiving banks similarly
situated.256 The burden of making available commercially reasonable
security procedures is imposed on banks because they generally
determine what security procedures can be used and are in the best
position to evaluate the efficacy of procedures necessary for bank
customers to combat fraud.257 Once a commercially reasonable
security procedure has been agreed upon by the bank and the
customer, the burden is on the customer to supervise its employees to
assure compliance with the security procedure and to safeguard

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See id art. 4A, Prefatory Note.
See id. § 4A-202, Official Comment 3.
See id § 4A-201.
See id
See id
See id § 4A-202(c).
See id § 4A-203, Official Comment 3.
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confidential security information and access to transmitting facilities
so that the security procedure cannot be breached.258
2.

When Can a Party Be Held Liable for a Payment Order It Did
Not Originate?

One of the contentious issues addressed in the drafting of Article
4A was the question of liability for unauthorized payment orders. 259
In some cases, it might be possible to trace the source of the
unauthorized order to an interloper who had penetrated the security
system of either the bank or its customer, or to a rogue employee of
either the bank or its customer. In hard cases, however, the malfeasor
would evade detection, leaving the bank and its customer to allocate
the loss without any information as to whose security system had been
breached. In this case, the banks felt that the default rule should
allocate the loss to their customers who, as the less technologically
sophisticated party, the banks deemed more likely to be the probable
cause of the loss.26° The cash managers of the banks' customers,
however, took issue with this assessment.2 6 The representatives of the
banks' customers at the drafting committee refused to accept a simple
loss allocation rule that would make the customer take the loss for
unexplained unauthorized payments out of their accounts. 262 The
representatives of the banks and their customers attending the drafting
committee meetings
eventually worked out a compromise acceptable
263
involved.
to all
The default rule in Article 4A for determining whether a payment
order received by a bank is in fact a duly authorized order of its
customer is the same as the default rule in Article 3: the party
claiming that the order is an authorized order must establish that it was
sent by someone with authority to represent the customer under the
law of agency.2 64 In the wire transfer context, however, this simple
rule imposes a difficult evidentiary burden on the bank receiving and
acting upon the customer's orders if those orders are sent and received
electronically. The bank will receive at a computer workstation within
the bank an electronic message that purports to be from the bank's
customer. Without taking steps to confirm the terms of the order using
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See id.
See Rubin, supra note 245, at 764.
See id
See id
See iL
See i.
See U.C.C. § 4A-202(a) (1996).
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an "out of band" or "back channel" communication with the bank's
customer, the bank may have a very hard time establishing the true
origin of the order; however, personal contact between the265
bank and its
customer for each wire transfer order may not be feasible.
In order to avoid this difficult evidentiary problem, the bank must
make a commercially reasonable security procedure available to the
customer, the bank and the customer must agree to a procedure that
they will use, and the bank must follow that procedure. 266 The
commercial reasonableness of the security procedure agreed upon by
the bank and its customer may be established with reference to the
customer's circumstances, 267 or the bank's customer may decide to
reject the bank's advice with regard to what an appropriate security
procedure would be and expressly agree in writing that the customer
will be bound by any payment order issued in its name and accepted
by the bank in compliance with the security procedure chosen by the
customer.268 The drafters of Article 4A thus used the contrast between
the default rule of agency law and the statutory safe harbor of a
commercially reasonable security procedure to give the bank, as the
technologically more sophisticated party, an incentive to bring
participants in the wire transfer system up to an appropriate level of
security in their systems for administering wire transfer orders.
The customer has one small opportunity to shift liability for an
unauthorized payment order back to the bank in the event that the
customer can demonstrate that the order was not caused, directly or
indirectly, by a person entrusted by the customer with any
responsibilities for executing wire transfer orders, or by a person who
obtained access to the wire transfer system through the customer's
facilities. 269 The customer must prove that the unauthorized order did
not originate through the actions of anyone acting on its behalf or
through its systems. Therefore, the most likely allocation of liability
for unauthorized payment orders remains squarely on the bank's
customer once a commercially reasonable security procedure has been
put in place.
Difficult is not the same as impossible, as one example illustrates.
In 1994, a Russian computer programmer removed $10 million from
Citibank customer accounts by initiating unauthorized funds transfers

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

See id. § 4A-203, Official Comment 2.
See id. § 4A-202(b).
See id. § 4A-202(c).
See id. § 4A-202(c).
See id § 4A-203(a)(2).
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from a laptop computer in St. Petersburg.2 7 0 Later, all but $400,000
was recovered and no bank customers were held liable for any of the
losses.
There are similarities between the law governing the use of
facsimile signature devices, which precludes the defense of forgery
based on negligence under negotiable instruments law, and the Article
4A rules concerning liability for unauthorized payment orders. For
both facsimile signature devices and electronic messages containing
wire transfer orders, in the absence of a formal written assumption of
the risk of unauthorized orders by the bank's customer, the bank is put
in the difficult position of establishing the factual basis for a claim that
the payment instruction was in fact authorized by the bank's
customer." For wire transfer payment mechanisms, once a security
procedure has been agreed upon for check-based payment systems, the
bank's customer must accept responsibility for payment instructions
sent by employees who breach the customer's internal security
systems.2 72 For negotiable instruments, however, unlike wire transfers,
the bank's customer is presumed by law to be capable of discerning
what constitutes ordinary care in the supervision of its employees with
responsibility for handling its checking accounts.27 3 In the realm of
electronic commerce, the customer is not presumed to know what
constitutes reasonable care until the bank, as the more technologically
sophisticated party, has evaluated its circumstances and made a
recommendation regarding appropriate security procedures. 274
D.

ConsumerElectronicFunds Transfers UnderRegulations
ZandE
Credit cards originated in the United States in the 1920s 75
Proprietary credit cards were issued by retail merchants to their
customers to simplify the administration of sales on credit.276 Travel
and entertainment cards developed in the 1950s to solve the problem
of the unacceptability of out-of-town checks. 277 A third-party
administrator such as Diners Club or American Express handled the
process of crediting the merchant and collecting payment from the
270. See Gow & Norton-Taylor, supra note 47, at 1.
271. See U.C.C. § 4A-203, Official Comment 1.

272. See id § 3-404(b).
273. See id
274. See id § 4A-202(b)-(c); id. § 4A-203, Official Comment 3.
275.

See EDWARD L. RuBIN & ROBERT COOTER, THE PAYMENT SYSTEM:

MATERiALS AND IssuEs 712 (2d ed. 1994).
276. See id
277. See id
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purchaser of goods and services, payment for which was due in full
upon receipt of each statement. 7 8 Bank of America offered the first
bank credit card in 1958, but it was not until the 1960s that the idea of
using a charge card as a mechanism for administering an open line of
bank credit to consumers became popular 2 7 9 In 1967, a consortium of
banks fonned an interbank card known as Mastercharge (later
MasterCard) to compete with Bank of America to provide a
"universal" credit card to consumers that would be acceptable
anywhere in the country." ° In 1970, Bank of America reorganized its
credit card operations as a separate company, Visa.281 Visa and
MasterCard now operate as "for-profit nonstock corporations" for the
benefit of their members who vote in governance matters on the basis
of the volume of payments they process through the system.282
Membership in Visa and MasterCard is limited to financial institutions
283
or those organizations who qualify for federal deposit insurance.
The credit card payment system is organized by contracts
between the cardholder and the card issuer, between the merchant and
the bank that purchases the customer charges from the merchant
("merchant bank"), and between the interchange (a centralized
computer clearinghouse) provided by Visa or MasterCard in which
card issuers and merchant banks must participate.284 In the 1960s,
these relationships were governed only by the contracts drawn up by
the card issuers and the merchant banks, except for
28generic regulations
applying to credit transactions such as usury laws.
In response to the development of practices that were deemed
irresponsible and unfair by regulators, in 1970 the federal government
amended the Consumer Credit Protection Ace 86 to deal with aspects
of the credit card system. Regulation Z issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 287 implements the
provisions of that statute. Among the abuses of the credit card
industry that the Consumer Credit Protection Act and Regulation Z
278. Seeid. at713.
279. See id. at 713-14.
280. See id. at 714.
281. See id
282. Seeid
283. See id. at 715. This discussion focuses on Visa and Mastercard because they are
the two largest credit card issuers in the U.S. market; other major issuers include American
Express, Discover Card, and Diners Club. See id. at 714.
284. See ia at 715.
285. See id.
286. See Consumer Credit Protection Act §§ 132-133, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
(1997).
287. See 12 C.ER. § 226 (1997).
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were designed to stop were the mailing of unsolicited cards through
the mail and
the allocation of risk for unauthorized use to the
8
consumer.2
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the first automated teller
machine (ATM) systems were installed by retail bank networks.289
Various state and federal legislative initiatives addressing the need for
consumer protections in the area of electronic funds transfers (EFI)
culminated in 1978 in the Electronic Funds Transfer Act,2 90 which
applies to automated clearinghouse (ACH) debit and credit transfers,
as well as to ATM transactions, point-of-sale (POS) transactions, and
home banking services. 291 Regulation E issued by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System implements the provisions
of that statute. 29a Regulation E has consumer protection provisions
similar to those of Regulation Z dealing with unsolicited issuance of
EFT access devices and the allocation of risk between the bank and
customer for unauthorized use of the access device.293
Although currently there are regulatory regimes under federal
law governing credit cards on the one hand and ATM or debit cards on
the other, both sets of regulations are substantially similar with regard
to consumer liability for unauthorized payments. The historical
differences that led to one set of regulations that apply when a
financial institution permits a consumer to make a payment with a
credit advance and another set of regulations that apply when a
consumer pays with a debit to the consumer's outstanding credit
balance at the financial institution are rapidly diminishing in
significance.294
1.

How Is a Consumer Payment or Electronic Funds Transfer
Authorized?

Before a credit card can be used to effect payment for §oods or
services, the card itself must be requested by the consumer.95 The
288. See id §§ 226.12-226.13.
289. See BAKER & BRANDEL, supranote 7, 1 1.03.
290. See Electronic Funds Transfer Act § 901 et seq., 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (1997).
291. See id § 1693(a)(6).
292. See 12 C.ER. § 205 (1997).
293. See id § 205.1(b).
294. In response to growing consumer concern over disparities in the treatment of
branded debit cards and credit cards, Visa and MasterCard both voluntarily undertook to
apply the Regulation Z liability rules (which are more generous to consumers) to debit cards
in lieu of the Regulation E rules (which are less favorable to consumers). See Bruce Mohl,
Visa Eases Theft Rules; Liability ProtectionBoosted for Customers, TiH BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 14, 1997, at Cl.
295. See 12 C.ER. § 226.12(a) (1997).
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card issuer should also provide a means to identify the cardholder on
the account or the authorized user of the card.2 9 This is generally
accomplished through the use of a signature tape on the back of the
card, permitting the merchant to compare the specimen signature on
the tape with the signature on the charge slip, although it may also be
accomplished through the use of a photograph or fingerprint on the
card.29 ' It may also be accomplished through the use of a PIN number
298
if, for example, the charge card is to be used with an ATM machine.
In addition, the issuer should provide the cardholder with the
information that the
cardholder would need to report the loss or theft
299
card.
credit
of the
The Federal Reserve Board staff has provided guidance to card
issuers regarding certain common situations in which certain common
commercial practices will be deemed not to have met the card issuer's
obligation to provide a means by which the cardholder may be
identified. 3°° The Official Commentary provides that a magnetic strip
(or similar device not readable without physical aids) alone that is not
used in connection with a secret code
or the like is not an adequate
30 1
holder.
card
the
identifying
of
means
Consumer Electronic Fund Transfers (EFTs) may take a wide
variety of forms, including POS transfers, ATM transfers, direct
deposits or withdrawals of funds from a consumer account, and
transfers initiated by telephone. 30 2 An EFT is authorized through the
use of an "access device," which may include a card, a code, or other
means of access to a consumer's account, or any combination that is
used by a consumer for the purpose of effecting an EFT.303 Thus, an
ATM card together with the associated PIN may constitute an "access
device. ' '3°4 As with credit cards, a consumer cannot be liable for EFrs
effected with an access device that the consumer has not requested or
296. See iaL§ 226.12(b)(2)(iii). If a means of identification is not provided, the issuer
may not hold the cardholder liable for any unauthorized charges.
297. See Federal Reserve Board, Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp.
1, § 226.12(b)(2)(iii)-l (1997).
298. See id § 226.12(a)(l)-8.
299. See id. § 226.12(b)(2)(ii)(1)-8. If this information is not provided, the issuer
many not hold the cardholder liable for any unauthorized charges.
300. See id. § 226.12(b)(2)(iii)-1.
301. See id § 226.12(b)(2)(iii)-2. This commentary provides that there is insufficient
means of identifying the user of a card if a corporate card is signed only by a corporate
representative who will not be the person using the card. See id
302. See Federal Reserve Board, Official Staff Interpretations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 205,
§ 205(g) (1997).
303. See id§ 205.2(a)(1).
304. See id§ 205.2-1.
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received in exchange for a previously accepted access device. 30 5 Also,
the financial institution should provide the consumer with information
regarding the consumer's possible liability for unauthorized EFTs
under certain circumstances and the information the consumer would
306
need to report that an unauthorized EFIT has been, or may be, made.
2.

When Can a Party Be Held Liable for a Payment or Funds
Transfer He or She Did Not Authorize?

The limitations on the liability of consumer credit card holders
for unauthorized payments are among the most radical, and successful,
consumer protection initiatives of the 1970s. Regulation Z provides
that a cardholder may be held liable for not more than $50 or the actual
amount of unauthorized charges, whichever is less, and even that small
amount cannot be charged to the card holder unless the card issuer has
met the following requirements: the card was accepted by the
consumer, the card issuer provided the consumer with adequate notice
of his or her potential liability, the issuer provided the consumer with
an adequate means of notifying the issuer in the event the card is lost
or stolen, the issuer provided a means of identifying the authorized
user of the card, and the unauthorized use must have occurred prior to
notification by the cardholder to the issuer of the loss or theft of the
card.30 7 This loss allocation rule places almost all of the risk of
unauthorized use squarely on the merchants accepting credit card
charges as a form of payment, merchant banks processing charge slips,
and card issuers.
As a result of this loss allocation rule, huge amounts have been
invested in system security features to reduce the incidence of credit
card fraud losses. Fraud loss prevention techniques include the
addition of cardholder photographs or holograms on credit cards to
make the manufacture of bogus cards using credit card information
more expensive and data mining techniques that permit the card issuer
to spot usage patterns that correlate with theft or fraudulent credit card
use before the cardholder may even be aware of the problem. 08 While
this loss allocation rule may seem to remove the economic incentives
305. See i1. § 205.2(a)(2). This is subject to certain exceptions contained in
§ 205.5(b), which regulates the issuing of ATM cards, such that ATM cards cannot function
until the consumer takes affirmative steps to validate them.
306. See id § 205.6(3). If this information is not provided, the financial institution

may not hold the consumer liable for any unauthorized charges.
307. See id, § 226.12(b)(2).
308. See Homer Brickey, CreditFirns, Crooks at War FraudLosses Reach $1 Billion
A Year, Amaz REPuBLIc, Jul. 15, 1995, at El.
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that would encourage consumers
from taking reasonable precautions,
309
this is apparently not the case.
The limitation on consumer liability for unauthorized use has
been very significant in building the market for telephone sales by
credit card. The Official Commentary to Regulation Z makes it clear
that the practice of accepting credit card information over the
telephone is done entirely at the merchant's risk in the event a
cardholder later claims a payment is unauthorized. 310 Because the
issuer has not provided the merchant with a means to identify the user
under these circumstances, the issuer has not fulfilled one of the
conditions for imposing liability on the cardholder.31 ' The Official
Commentary points out that merchandise may be ordered by telephone
by someone other than the cardholder using credit card information
that may have been improperly obtained in any number of ways; in the
event that the consumer contests a telephone charge as unauthorized,
the card issuer will be required to charge back the payment to the
merchant's bank.312
The favorable treatment of consumers in dealing with losses
caused by unauthorized use of credit cards is reinforced by other rights
bestowed on consumers by Regulation Z. Subject to certain
limitations, consumers retain the right to assert claims or defenses
arising in their transactions with merchants against the credit card
issuer and refuse payment for the amount in dispute.313 In addition,
Regulation Z defines an error resolution procedure that requires the
card issuer to wait for payment pending
its investigation into the
3 14
consumer's allegation of billing errors.
With regard to unauthorized EFIs, the provisions of Regulation
E are similar to those of Regulation Z, although less generous to the
consumer. When hearings were conducted on the need for consumer
protections in the EFT arena, consumer advocates argued that the
same degree of protection should be extended to EFTs, but
representatives of the financial services industry argued that the
309. See Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for
ConsumerPayments, 66 TEX. L. REv. 63, 91 (1987).
310. See Federal Reserve Board, Official Staff Interpretations, pt. 226, supp. I,
§ 226.12(b)(2)(iii)-3 (1997).
311. Seeid
312. See id. §§ 226.12(c)(2)-1,226.13-2.
313. See id § 226.12(c). The cardholder is required to make a good faith attempt to
resolve the dispute with the merchant. The credit card issuer is not required to be involved in
disputes that involve less than $50 or disputes that arise within the cardholder's state or
within 100 miles of the cardholder's address. See id § 226.12(c)(3)(ii).
314. Seeid §226.13.
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negligence standard in UCC § 3-406 should apply.315 The result was a
more complicated loss-allocation formula that provides nonnegligent
consumers with the same protection as provided to credit card holders
but that imposes a greater proportion of any losses on the consumer as
the consumer's negligence in reporting the loss or theft of the access
device grows.316 The consumer who promptly reports the loss or theft
of the access device is liable for the lesser of $50 or the amount of the
unauthorized EFrs, but a consumer who fails to notify the financial
institution within two business days of learning of the loss or theft may
be liable for up to $500.317 A consumer who falls to report the loss or
theft of the access device within sixty days of the account statement
being transmitted to the consumer may be liable for the entire amount
days and before the
of unauthorized charges that occur after the sixty
31
consumer finally gives notice to the institution. 9
E. ProposedRevisions to the UCC Definition of Signature and
Writing
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute have appointed drafting
committees to prepare revisions to UCC Articles 1, 2, 2A, and 9 and to
prepare a draft of a proposed new Article 2B governing software
contracts and information licensing. 19 Among the changes being
considered are the substitution of the term "record" for the term
"writing" and the term "authenticated" for the term "signed" in order
to permit electronic contracts to meet statute of frauds requirements.
For example, the March 1998 draft of proposed UCC § 2B-102
provides the following definitions:
"Authenticate" means to sign, or to execute or adopt a symbol or sound,
or to encrypt or process a record in whole or in part, with intent by the
authenticating party to
(a) identify that party;
(b) adopt or accept a record or term that contains the
authentication or to which a record containing the authentication
refers; or
315. See ElectronicFunds Transfer Systems: Hearing on Oversight on the Report of
the National Commission on Electronic Funds Transfers entitled "EFT and the Public
Interest" Before the Subcomm. On FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housingand Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. Sess. 1 (1977).
316. See 12 C.R. § 205.6(b).
317. Seeid
318. See id.
319. See generally Amelia Boss & Jane Kaufman Winn, The Emerging Law of
ElectronicCommerce, 52 Bus. LAw. 1469 (1997).
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(c) attest to the integrity of a record or term.
"Attribution procedure" means a procedure established by law ore
regulation or established by agreement or adopted by the parties for the
purpose of verifying that an electronic authentication, record, message,
or performance is that of the respective party or for detecting changes
2
or errors in content.. 320
In the July 1997 draft of Article 2B, the draft official comment
provided that "attribution procedures" per se constitute authentication,
but this suggestion was removed from subsequent drafts. At the time
this Article was written, these changes had not yet been officially
adopted by NCCUSL or ALL.
IV. How SHOULD AUTHENTICATION PROCEDURES USED iN INTERNET
COMMERCE BE REGULATED?

A.

Different Approaches to Regulating Open Network
AuthenticationProcedures

Although electronic commerce is arguably as old as the
telegraph, the possibility of reducing transaction costs while improving
speed and accuracy in commercial transactions through the use of
networked computers has only achieved widespread attention in the
last decade. In the 1980s, the popularity of EDI contracting triggered a
debate on the issues of adapting existing commercial law to take into
account new computer messaging and record processing
technologies.3 2' However, EDI technology was introduced largely
through the creation of proprietary systems that were operated by the
participants themselves or by value-added networks. 22 As a result,
participation in EDI electronic contracting often required a substantial
investment in proprietary network technologies.323 This requirement
of an initial investment in proprietary communications technology
served as a sort of de facto channeling mechanism, limiting the
implementation of electronic commerce procedures to parties with
existing commercial relationships, as well as to parties willing to make
a substantial investment in the technology required.3 24

The emergence of the Internet as a possible medium of
communication for electronic commerce has introduced a new and
320. See U.C.C. 2B-102 (March 1998 discussion draft) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/
library/ulcducc2Iucc2b797.htm>.
321. See ABA, Commercial Use, supranote 115, at 1645.
322. See Paul Taylor, Electronic Commerce: Dawn of a Dynamic Trade Era,
FINANCrALTnEs (London), Feb. 25, 1988, at 6.
323. See id
324. See id
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different environment for online contracting. Much of the initial
investment in Internet technology is being made by businesses who
wish to use web sites for general marketing and Intranet to distribute
internal materials; redeploying these same resources for electronic
commerce in effect substantially lowers the initial investment required
to enter the arena. The ubiquitousness of the Internet means that
consumers, as well as businesses, are able to participate in electronic
commerce. The use of open standards for Internet network protocols
means that the array of potential participants in Internet commerce is
virtually unlimited in number and in geographic distribution.
Unlike the electronic contracting practices that prevailed when
EDI conducted over proprietary VANs was the state-of-the-art
technology, Internet commerce brings problems of computer security
to the forefront of the issues facing prospective participants. The
contracting parties must now consider not only all of the standard
issues involved in any contract, such as the reliability of the
representations or the creditworthiness of the other party, but they must
also factor in the security of their own access to the Internet from the
threat of attacks by interlopers, as well as the security of the other
party's computer system. While the threat of attacks by interlopers
was present with EDI electronic contracting, the openness of the
Internet obviously increases the magnitude of the threat of attack. The
Internet also lays the technical foundation for entering into online
contracts with strangers whose real-world identity has not been
confirmed with "out of band" or "back channel" communications.
In response to these new challenges posed by open network
electronic commerce, state legislatures have responded in a variety of
ways; the federal government and UNCITRAL are now debating
what, if any, action is appropriate in those arenas. 325 One of the first
attempts to deal systematically with these issues, however, came from
the American Bar Association Section of Science and Technology in
1992 when the Information Security Committee began work on a
project that culminated in 1996 with the publication of the ABA
Digital Signature Guidelines. 326 The Guidelines do not purport to be a
325. See generally Report of the Working Group on Electronic Commerce on the
Work of its 32d Session (Vienna, 19-30 Jan. 1998) A/CN.9/446, Feb. 10, 1998. For more
information on UNCITRAL initiatives, see Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital
Signature Legislation,UNC1TRAL Web Site <http://www.mbc.com/legis/uncitral.html>; see
also 1997 S.B. 1594 (Utah); Electronic Financial Services Efficiency Act of 1997, 1997 H.B.
2327 (Utah).
326. See generally INFORMATION SECURITY COMMIrrEE, supra note 2.

These

guidelines developed in tandem with legislation that was enacted in Utah in 1995. See UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101-504 (1997). The Utah legislation differs in certain respects from the
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model law, but rather try to offer general statements of principle
regarding the development of public key infrastructures with the
intention of influencing
the more precise rules that will develop within
327
systems.
legal
various
1.

ABA Digital Signature Guidelines

The ABA Digital Signature Guidelines are the path-breaking
project of a large number of attorneys and technologists who were
familiar with public key cryptography and who believed that the full
commercial exploitation of this technology could only take place once
some of the legal uncertainty surrounding its implementation had been
resolved. 8 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the promise of
public key cryptography for commercial applications was becoming
more widely recognized, there were no legal precedents upon which to
build a business model of a public key infrastructure. This lack of a
recognized legal framework was felt to have a chilling effect on the
development of commercial applications of public key cryptography,
and it was this problem that
the drafters of the Digital Signature
329
address.
to
out
set
Guidelines
The Guidelines list the names of seventy-seven individuals who
contributed to the project, in addition to the nine members of the
editorial committee. These eighty-six individuals came from a variety
of backgrounds including government service, academia, information
technology and security, notaries from various legal systems, as well
as law practice.33 0 Notwithstanding the active participation of this
large group of individuals, the Guidelines represent a fairly focused
analysis of certain specific issues raised by the creation of a public key
infrastructure. One of the explicit objectives of the Guidelines was the
promotion of a specific technology: the use of digital signature
Digital Signature Guidelines, such as in the specific requirements set forth by Utah for the
licensing of certification authorities. See generallyC. Bradford Biddle, MisplacedPriorities:
The Utah DigitalSignature Act and LiabilityAllocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1143 (1996) (discussing the Utah legislation and the issues it raises).

327. See INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITrEE, supra note 2, at 23.
328. Alan Asay and Michael Baum were among the most influential leaders of the
process. Alan Asay, who served as a reporter for the project, was an attorney with the
Information Technology Division of the Utah Administrative Office of the Courts and one of
the principal architects of the Utah digital signature law. Michael Baum, who served as chair
of the Information Security Committee, was author of one of the first books to address the
legal and policy implications of creating a public key infrastructure. See generally MICHAEL
S. BAUM, FEDERAL CERTIFICATION AurHoRITY LIABILITY AND POLICY: LAw AND POLICY OF
CERTIFICATE-BASED PUBLIC KEY AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES (1994).
329. See INFORMATION SECURITY CoMMrrrEE, supra note 2, at 23.

330. See id at 1-2.
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technology based on the X.509 standard established by the
International Telecommunications Union. 33 1 The drafters of the
Guidelines conceptualized their undertaking as giving "legal effect to
the general import of the technical standards for authentication of
computerized messages." 332 In the Introduction to the Guidelines, the
drafters state: "Modem cryptography can make information safe from
eavesdropping, tampering, or forgery, regardless of the security of a
communication channel ... [with the support of public key
infrastructure] ... cryptographic technology can also authenticate a

message by assuredly linking
it to an identified person and guarding
333
the message's integrity."
One of the implied objectives of the Guidelines was the creation
of a legal framework within which commercial developers using the
X.509 directory standard and patented encryption technology, such as
that licensed by RSA Data Security, Inc., would feel that the risks of
potential liability to users of the system could be kept within tolerable
limits. The focus on creating a framework within which commercial
developers would feel confident in marketing new products and
services was not directed at all, or even most, of the models of
electronic commerce currently in use. The consensus among the
participants was that closed system applications of public key
cryptography did not pose the same theoretical or legal challenges in
their commercial development as the case of global stranger-tostranger commerce over an open network.334
Therefore, the
Guidelines have minimal relevance to the development and marketing
of closed systems based on bilateral, bound community, membership,
or robust local administration models, or to an open system based on
server security in which individual users are not assigned their own
keys. 35 In closed systems, all of the relevant parties are presumed to
be either in contractual privity with each other or bound into some
other form of community that will provide some of the essential
administrative infrastructure and dispute resolution mechanisms
required to manage public key cryptography.
The Guidelines deal with the type of infrastructure needed for a
system in which trusted third parties in the role of certification
331. See id at 18. The ITU X.500 series of technical standards provides the basis for
constructing a multipurpose distributed directory service by interconnecting computer
systems belonging to service providers, governments, and private organizations, on a
potentially global scale. See FORD & BAuM, supranote 98, at 213.
332. INFORMATION SEcuRrry COMMrrrEE, supra note 2, at 18.
333. Id at 21.
334. See Digital Signature Symposium, JURiMERmcs (forthcoming 1998).
335. See generallyINFORMATION SECURrrY COMMrrrEE, supra note 2.
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authorities (CAs) provide a service limited to screening the online
identity of parties at the moment the decision is made to issue a digital
signature certificate.336 There is no substantive regulation of how the
CA makes the decision to issue a certificate beyond requiring that it
disclose in its certification practice statement the procedures that it will
follow.337 A CA has certain duties with regard to disclosing digital
signature certificates and making information regarding the revocation
of certificates available to relying parties; however, the Guidelines do
not contemplate any active monitoring by the CA of the continued
validity of any of the information provided by a subscriber.338 The
Guidelines provide that a CA that has complied with the Guidelines,
including fulfillment of the obligations that it has undertaken in its
certification practice statement, is339
not liable for any losses incurred by
a subscriber or by a relying party.
This limit on the potential liability of the CA to subscribers and
relying parties, above and beyond any liability that it has expressly
undertaken and set forth in its certification practice statement, is a
pivotal risk allocation rule in the Guidelines. It stands in marked
contrast to the Article 4A wire transfer rules and the consumer credit
card and EFIT rules, in which the providers of the technology remain
on the hook for at least some of the risk of unauthorized or fraudulent
use of the technology.34 The drafters of the Guidelines recognized
that, without contractual privity between the CA and the relying party,
and in spite of contractual terms that attempt to bind the subscriber to
the terms of the CA's certification practice statement, there was a
substantial risk that a court might entertain the claims of disgruntled
subscribers or relying parties that the CA should be held liable for
some or all of the losses that those parties might suffer in transactions
in which the CA's certificates were used. The lack of legal precedent
regarding the duties of CAs created an undesirable ambiguity from the
point of view of potential CAs, particularly because case law drawn
from analogous situations was not very favorable to the CA position.
For example, in Kline v. FirstWestern Government Securities, Inc., the
court refused to grant summary judgment to a law firm that denied its
liability to investors based on opinion letters that the law firm issued to
an investment firm marketing tax shelters.3 41 The opinion letter
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See id § 3.7, at 86-87.
See id. § 3.2, at 80-81.
Seeid §3.11,at89-95.
See id. § 3.14, at 99-100.
See supra notes 198-318 and accompanying text.
24F3d 480,490 (3d Cir. 1994).
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described the effectiveness of those investments as tax shelters, after
the IRS disallowed the investments as tax shelters.3 42 The court noted
that, notwithstanding the attempt of the law firm to limit its potential
liability to investors by stating in the opinion letters that they were for
the exclusive use of the investment firm, the law firm knew that the
investment firm was distributing copies of the opinion letters to
prospective investors to encourage them to invest.3 43 Cases such as
Kline indicate that a CA might reasonably be concerned about its
ability to limit its liability to the terms set out in its certification
practice statement. If the Guidelines are as influential as their drafters
hope in shaping legislation on authentication procedures, then CAs
will enjoy statutory limitations on their potential liability to subscribers
and relying parties.
Because the starting point for the analysis of security issues in the
Guidelines is public key cryptography, the Guidelines place a great
deal of emphasis on communication security and much less emphasis
on system security beyond the system maintained by the CA.3 44 While
the Guidelines require that a CA maintain a "trustworthy" system and
insure that its employees and contractors support the maintenance of
that trustworthy system, there is no requirement that a subscriber
345
maintain a trustworthy system except when generating a key pair.
However, a subscriber is obliged to safeguard a private key
corresponding to the public key in the certificate; the commentary to
the Guidelines suggests that the standard of care involved in
safeguarding a private key should be higher than the standard of care
imposed by federal law on credit card or ATM card holders. 346 While
it might be possible to define what constitutes a trustworthy system for
a CA with reference to guidelines developed in military and financial
services contexts, it is unclear what an appropriate level of security is
for an individual using public key cryptography
for household or
34
personal use on an individual personal computer.
Although the Guidelines provide no guidance on the question of
how subscribers or relying parties are expected to implement this
technology, and thus no basis for predicting its reliability in actual
commercial applications, the Guidelines nevertheless recommend the
342. See id at 482-83.
343. See id at 483-84.
344. See generally INFORMATION SECURITY CoMMrrrEE, supra note 2 (dealing at
length with communication security in particular).
345. See iL §§ 1.35,3.1,3.4,4.1, at 69-101.
346. See id § 4.3, Comment 4.3.2, at 104.
347. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of security risks to
personal computers that are not understood by most individual computer users.
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enactment of presumptions regarding the validity of electronic
messages that have been digitally signed using public key
cryptography. 348
The commentary makes clear that these
presumptions are meant to track the presumptions in negotiable
instruments law, although at the time the Guidelines were written there
34 9
were no commercial applications of this technology in use.
However, the presumption of validity of signatures associated with
negotiable instruments developed slowly in response to actual
experience with commercial practices. 350 Any presumption of validity
that attaches to the use of public key cryptography at present must be
based on confidence in the efficacy of the design of the technology
itself, not on any evidence of how the technology is actually used in
practice in electronic commerce systems.
By focusing a particular vision of the type of public key
infrastructure necessary to facilitate a form of global electronic
commerce that may develop in the future, the Guidelines may fulfill
their stated mission of giving legal effect to the technology. Yet they
fail to address in a systematic fashion the fundamental business
concerns of the electronic contracting parties today who will play the
roles of subscribers and relying parties under the Guidelines.
Electronic commerce is still commerce, and parties enter into contracts
when all the business risks associated with the transaction have been
estimated and assessed. In addition to the risks of mistaken identity or
lack of message integrity addressed by public key cryptography,
contracting parties need other information regarding possible conflicts
of laws. For example, if the parties do not reside in the same
jurisdiction, there is the risk of being haled into court in a remote and
hostile jurisdiction in the event of a dispute arising out of the
transaction. Other unknowns are the legal capacity of the other party
to enter into a contract if the other party is a business organization
rather than a natural person and, perhaps most fundamentally, the
ability of the other party to fulfill its contractual undertaking. The
Guidelines are silent on how these basic business concerns will be
addressed
in electronic commerce based on public key crypto351
graphy.

348. See IN-ORMATiON SEcuRn'Y COMMITrEE, supranote 2, § 5.6 at 117-18.
349. See id. § 5.6, Comment 5.6.5, at 119.
350. The presumption did not exist in the Negotiable Instrument Law, the uniform law
that was the predecessor to UCC Article 3. See U.C.C. § 3-307, Comment 1 (1989).
351. See generally INFORMAMTON SECURITY COMMrIrrE, supra note 2 (declining to
address these issues).
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Instead, the Guidelines discuss at great length the rights and
obligations of the parties with respect to what the drafters presumed
would be the primary activity of a CA-issuing certificates. The
model of organization of the CA's services in the Guidelines
corresponds closely with the organization of some of the services
offered by VeriSign, Inc., the first commercial CA to offer its services
52
to the public in the United States. 3 VeriSign offers 'Digital IDs"
from its web site, which are essentially all-purpose IDs for the
Internet. 35 3 In July 1997, VeriSign had three classes of digital
signature certificates for individuals. These include Class 1 Digital
IDs that indicate only the uniqueness of a name and e-mail address in
VeriSign's database; in issuing a Class 1 Digital ID, VeriSign verifies
the applicant's e-mail address. VeriSign does not intend these
certificates for commercial use where proof of identity would be
required; rather, these certificates are intended for use in web-browsing
and certain e-mail applications.354 Class 2 Digital IDs provide a
slightly higher lever of assurance of the applicant's identity, as VeriSign
checks his or her personal identity information against a commercial
credit database and performs other validation procedures. 355 However,
there is no requirement that the subscriber appear in person before a
trusted third party as part of the identification process. VeriSign
intends that these certificates be used in such applications as e-mail
applications,
online subscription services, and password
6
replacement.
A Class 3 Digital ID from VeriSign requires the
applicant to personally present appropriate identification documents to
a notary public or a VeriSign-approved local registration authority.357
VeriSign intends these certificates to be used in such applications as ebanking, corporate database access, personal banking, and
membership-based online services. 358 In response to the criticism that
352. See VeriSign Web Site (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.verisign.com>.
353. See id., VeriSign Secure Server IDs (visited Mar. 3, 1998)
<http://www.verisign.com/products/sites/index.html>.
354. See id, VeriSign Certification Practice Statement 11.2, at 8-10 (visited Jan. 20,
1998) <http'/www.verisign/com/repository/cps/>. In July 1997, the price of a Class 2
individual Digital ID was $19.95 annually. See id, Digital ID Pricing (visited Jan. 20, 1998)
<http://www.verisign.com/products/pricing.htn-l>. The VeriSign CPS 12.2.1 points out that
'THESE CERTIFICATES PROVIDE THE LOWEST LEVEL OF ASSURANCE OF ALL
VERISIGN CERTIFICATES. THEY ARE NOT INTENDED FOR COMMERCIAL USE
WHERE PROOF OF IDENTITY IS REQUIRED AND SHOULD NOT BE RELIED UPON
FOR SUCH USES." Id., Verisign Certification Practice Statement [2.2.1 (visited Jan. 21,
1998) <http://www.verisign.com/repository/CPS1.2/CPSCH2.HTM#_toc361806948>.
355. See id 2.2.2.
356. See id
357. See id 2.2.3.
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the VeriSign marketing strategy exposes consumers to unreasonable
risks for unauthorized use of their digital ID, VeriSign's Class 1 Digital
IDs include $1,000 of insurance against the loss of use or corruption of
the ID; the
Class 2 Digital ID+ product includes $25,000 of
359
insurance.
In applying for and accepting a Digital ID, the subscriber agrees
to the terms of the Subscriber Agreement, 360 which incorporates by
reference VeriSign's Certification Practice Statement (CPS).36 1 The
VeriSign CPS Version 1.2 is 104 pages long. The "Quick Summary of
Important CPS Rights and Obligations" points out that the subscriber
has an obligation to keep his or her private key secure from
compromise in a trustworthy manner but assures the subscriber that
the software system should provide this functionality.362 Within the
CPS itself, however, the allocation of risk is made more explicit, and
without any reassurances as to the likely functionality of the
subscriber's software system:
EACH CERTIFICATE APPLICANT (AND, UPON APPROVAL,
EACH SUBSCRIBER) ACKNOWLEDGES THAT SUCH PERSON,
AND NOT VERISIGN (OR THE APPLICABLE IA [issuing
authority)), IS EXCLUSIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROTECTING
HIS, HER, OR ITS PRIVATE KEY(S) FROM COMPROMISE,
LOSS,363 DISCLOSURE, MODIFICATION, OR UNAUTHORIZED
USE.

The public key infrastructure as described in the ABA Digital
Signature Guidelines and as currently marketed by VeriSign provides
consumers with some insurance coverage to lower their possible
liability for unauthorized use. This is in marked contrast with the
federal regulatory regimes for credit cards and EFTs that cap consumer
358. See id. In January 1998, no price information was available on the VeriSign web
site regarding Class 3 individual Digital IDs. See id., Digital ID Pricing (visited Mar. 3,
1998) <http://www.verisign.com/products/pricing.html>.
359. The NetSure protection plan is an enhanced warranty service provided to
subscribers (not to relying parties) that protects against certain risks of compromise,
impersonation, delay in properly communicating a request for revocation or suspension,
unauthorized suspension or revocation, loss of use, or erroneous issuance. See id, NetSure
Protection Plan (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http:llwww.verisign.comlrepository/netsurel>.
360. See id., Subscriber Agreement (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.verisign.com/
repository/SUBAGR.htnil>.
361. See id, VeriSign Repository (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.verisign.
com/repository>.
362. See ia, VeriSign Certification Practice Statement, Version 1.2, Quick Summary

of Important CPS Rights and Obligations § 4 (visited Jan. 20, 1998) <http://www.verisign.
com/repository/cps/>.
363. Seeid 4.1.1.
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liability 364 At this time, there is no way to know whether or not the
NetSure insurance offered to VeriSign subscribers will adequately
offset any potential liability arising out of using the Internet for
financial and commercial transactions. The risk
that it will not is on
3 65
technology.
the
of
developer
and
promoter
the
The allocation of risks between the CA as the vendor of a
technology service and the consumer of that service is in marked
contrast with the allocation of risks between the bank and its customer
set up under UCC Article 4A. The drafters of Article 4A conditioned
the ability of the technologically more sophisticated party to shift the
risk of unauthorized payment orders onto the less technologically
sophisticated party on the implementation of a commercially
reasonable security procedure.366 This allocation of rights and
responsibilities corresponds with the creation of closed systems in
which the parties are willing and able to negotiate individual
agreements and within which new customers are signed up only after
considerable "out of band" or "back channel" communications.
The business model implicit in the Guidelines and implemented
by VeriSign is based on the assumption that the CA will not invest any
effort in learning about the subscriber's circumstances, nor will it
make any meaningful disclosure to the subscriber regarding the
appropriate level of security procedures that the subscriber should
implement. Instead, VeriSign uses a complex, lengthy legal document,
incorporated by reference into the subscriber's agreement, to disclaim
any responsibility for ascertaining the subscriber's competence to live
up to its assigned responsibilities or its comprehension of the potential
risks that it is undertaking in subscribing to VeriSign's service. This
allocation of risk is a logical consequence of its mass-market, lowprice business model. For an annual fee of $9.95 or $19.95, VeriSign
has not collected enough in fees to cover the costs of negotiating
individually with its subscribers or investigating their circumstances.
The service that VeriSign is offering consumers has a very low
initial price and, in combination with the new NetSure insurance
program, may offer very good value to the consumer. However, until
the risks of Internet electronic commerce are better understood, it is
possible that consumers may discover to their dismay that the real
364. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
365. VeriSign is a privately held joint venture whose principal investors include
Ameritech, AT&T, Cisco Systems Inc., Intuit, Microsoft, Data Security, Security Dynamics,
Softbank, Reuters, and VISA International. See VeriSign Corporate Fact Sheet (visited Jan.
21, 1998) <http://www.verisign.compr/prcfct.htm>.
366. See U.C.C. § 4A-202(b)-(c) (1996); itt § 4A-203, Official Comment 3.
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costs of a VeriSign Digital ID are much higher than they initially
understood. The real costs to merchants and consumers participating
in the emerging Internet marketplace should be measured by adding
the costs of adequate system security to the costs of communication
security provided by public key cryptography and a digital signature
certificate. Closed systems for Internet commerce more accurately
reflect this real total cost in their pricing structure by explicitly pricing
the costs of setting up a public key infrastructure that is adapted to the
special requirements of the group using it. In the absence of the kind
of safe harbor for CAs that the Guidelines advocate, a mass-market
CA such as VeriSign will be under pressure to modify upward its
pricing structure, with any increase in prices representing an implicit
insurance premium collected to compensate the CA for assuming
more of the risks associated with Internet commerce. A similar result
could be achieved by mandating a cap on total subscriber liability, not
just liability per transaction as VeriSign now offers. For a certificate to
have much value for merchants in a system with caps on total
subscriber liability, the CA would have to add some sort of online
monitoring of the subscriber's total liability similar to that now
provided by credit card issuers. The overhead associated with such a
monitoring service would drive up the prices charged subscribers for
certificates.
In the Guidelines, as in the VeriSign product line, it is presumed
that the person signing is the proper customer of the CAs services, not
the contracting party relying on the signature.3 67 If this is the case in
practice, merchants relying on public key certificates have no
overhead beyond maintaining their own digital signatures and software
capable of processing information about their customers' signatures.
The merchants as relying parties are presumed not to be the primary
customer of the CA's services. In order to bridge the gap between the
technology of public key cryptography and the legal concept of a
signature as evidence of intent to be legally bound, the party accepting
the digital signature certified by the CA should have to have some
evidence of the context within which the digital signature was affixed
to the record. Knowledge of the security built into the encryption
software is one part of what the contracting partner will wish to know.
However, as with the facsimile signature devices or the wire transfer
security procedures, mere evidence that the software was used without
any information about who was using the software will make it very
hard for a contracting party to overcome a claim that the use of the
367. See generallyINFORMATION SECURNTY COMMrrrEE, supra note 2.
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software was unauthorized. The mass market certification services
offered by VeriSign and contemplated by the Guidelines therefore
offer only a partial solution to the merchant wishing to market goods
and services over the Internet. The merchant will have the choice of
going outside a public key infrastructure by either directly contacting
its customers using an "out of band" or "back channel"
communication, contracting with another service provider for
additional screening services, or including in its pricing a higher risk of
default due to unauthorized use of authentication procedures.
2.

Minimalist Enabling Legislation

In 1997, Rhode Island enacted digital signature legislation that
rejects the approach taken by the Guidelines, adopting instead a
"technology neutral" approach that creates a level playing field
between traditional commercial practices and electronic commerce
without modifying any existing loss allocation rules or creating any
new ones. 368 The Rhode Island legislation was based on a model
developed by the legal staff of the Information Technology Division of
the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts through an open consultative
369
process.

The Rhode Island legislation defines "'[e]lectronic signatures"'
as "an electronic identifier, created by a computer, and intended by the
party using it to have the same force and effect as the use of a manual
signature"1370 With regard to any rule of law that requires a signature,
that rule is now deemed satisfied by an electronic signature.
With
regard to whether an electronic signature was executed or adopted
with respect to an electronic record by a particular person, the trier of
fact may consider any relevant information or circumstances,
including whether the signature is unique to the signer, whether
unauthorized persons have had the opportunity to create the signature,
whether the signature is capable of verification, and whether the
reliability of the method used to create, store, and communicate the
signature was appropriate for the purposes for which is was created.372
However, the statute further provides that its terms shall not apply
when its application would involve a construction of a law that is
368. See Rhode Island Electronic Signatures and Records Act, R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-

127 (1997).
369. Information on the Massachusetts iTD efforts is available from the ITD web site
at <http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/itd/legal> (visited Jan. 21, 1998).
370. R.I. GEN. LAws 42-127-3(a).
371. See id § 42-127-4(a).
372. See id § 42-127-4(c).
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clearly inconsistent with the manifest intent of the lawmaking body or
is repugnant to the context of the law, provided that the mere
requirement of a "signature" or that a record
be "signed" shall not be
373
itself sufficient to establish such an intent.
'This legislation is neutral with regard to the various models of
Internet electronic commerce currently in use-closed models based
on bilateral, bound community membership, or robust local
administration models, or open models based on server or client
security. Each of these models will face the same risks of being tested
in litigation, and none will benefit from a statutory blessing for its
internal model for allocating risk and responsibility.
Within concrete dispute resolution processes, the equities of
actual cases will be weighed and the actual circumstances of the
parties involved will be taken into account. The provisions of the
statute provide guidance to a finder of fact in identifying
circumstances that will clarify the issue of what the parties' actual
intent was when using the electronic signature as an authentication
procedure. 74 No legislative imprimatur is given to a particular
implementation of a specific technology, so there is no impediment to
the continued development of new commercial authentication
products, whether based on cryptography, biometrics, tokens, or some
combination of all three.3"5
B.

UCCArticle 8 and the Dangerof Drafting Technology-Specific
CommercialLaw

The first article of the UCC expressly to address the impact of
information technology on commercial practice was Article 8
governing investment securities.376 Article 8 was systematically
revised first in 1978, and then again in 1994, in an effort to
accommodate the use of new technology to streamline the process of
clearing and settling securities trades.377 The 1978 revision of Article
8 was courageous in its effort to anticipate the manner in which new
technologies would be implemented, yet ultimately failed to achieve
its goal of ushering in a new era of efficiency in the securities
settlement system. The 1994 revision was based on a careful

373. See id § 42-127-4(e).

374. See id
375. See id § 42-127-4(a).
376. See U.C.C. art. 8 (1996).
377. See James Steven Rogers, Policy Perspectives on Revised UCC Article 8, 43

UCLA L. REv. 1431,1435 (1996).
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examination of actual industry practices and adopted provisions that
harmonized with those practices. 378
The original 1957 version of Article 8 was based on the
assumption that possession and delivery of physical certificates were
the basis of the securities holding system.379 Stock certificates were
sent to the issuer or a transfer agent to be reissued in the name of the
new owner. By the late 1960s, this cumbersome, time-consuming
process began to threaten the ability of banks and broker-dealers to
achieve timely settlement for stock trades. The drafters of the 1978
revisions envisaged a system in which uncertificated securities would
be maintained as computer records on the books of issuers or their
transfer agents and stock transfers would be effected by electronic
book entry.380 This vision was a generalization from the first largescale implementation of electronic securities transfers accomplished
for United States government securities. U.S. government securities
have existed only as electronic records in federal government
computers since the 1970s, and the drafters reasonably inferred that
the private sector would adopt this model for converting paper-based
transfer systems to electronic systems.38'
Many of the arguments being made today in support of
technology-specific legislation to promote the development of a public
key infrastructure is remarkably similar to the rhetoric used to justify
the technology-specific approach of the 1978 Article 8. The drafters
of Article 8 argued that, without the certainty that their statute would
provide, the natural and inevitable movement of the securities industry
toward the
most efficient new electronic practices would be needlessly
382
delayed.
The system envisaged by the drafters of the 1978 Article 8 failed
to materialize, however. The banks and broker-dealers, in cooperation
with the Depository Trust Company (DTC-a trust company
organized for the benefit of its participants) and the National Securities
Clearing Corporation (NSCC), devised their own solution to the
problem. A system of "indirect" holding developed in which DTC
maintained "jumbo" certificates, representing shares in its possession,
and transferred securities by adjustments to participant's accounts at
378. See iL
379. See U.C.C. art. 8, Prefatory Note (1995).
380. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Beyond Negotiability: A New Model for Transfer
and Pledge ofInterests in Securities Controlledby Intermediaries,12 CARDozo L. REV. 305,

311 (1990).
381. See Martin J. Aronstein, Robert Haydock, Jr. & Donald A. Scott, Article 8 Is
Ready, 93 HARv. L. REv. 889,890-93 (1980).
382. SeeidLat914.

1252

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1177
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Participant banks and broker-dealers in turn provided similar
services to their own customers.3 The 1978 Article 8 could not
accommodate this system, because it was based on the assumption that
investors would own securities directly, either in the form of physical
certificates or as book entries in the accounts of issuers or transfer
agents. Following record trading levels during the stock market crash
in October 1987, serious concerns arose over the ambiguous legal
status of actual industry practices and how that might adversely affect
the ability of regulators
or industry to respond to the failure of a major
385
market participant.
Given the failure of the 1978 revisions to anticipate the direction
of future developments, together with the fact that both direct and
indirect holdings of securities are now in use in the current system, the
drafters of the 1994 Article 8 strove to maintain neutrality with regard
to how market participants would implement technology.386 In
addition, the drafters sought to establish clear and certain rules that
would make the operation of the securities holding system more
transparent. 387 This would promote finality of settlements, reducing
investors' risk of loss from the failure of another financial
intermediary within the system.388
Rather than try to capture the complex relationships between
investors and financial services intermediaries in the provisions of
Article 8, the drafters defined new terms, including "security
entitlement' '389 and "entitlement holder.' 390 A security entitlement
arises when a financial asset is credited to a securities account
maintained with a financial intermediary.391 Article 8 describes what a
holder of a securities entitlement can expect from a financial
intermediary-that it must maintain sufficient financial assets to
satisfy the claims of all its entitlement holders and that the
intermediary's financial assets that are held for the entitlement holders
are not the property of the intermediary nor are the assets subject to the
claims of the intermediary's general creditors. 392 The drafters of
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
suggestion
390.
391.
392.

See Mooney, supra note 380, at 317-18.
See id.
See Rogers, supra note 377, at 1445-46.
See id
See id. at 1446.
Seeiaat 1442-45.
See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(17) (1996); see also Mooney, supra 380 (for the first
of this concept).
See U.C.C. § 8-102(a)(7).
See id § 8-501.
See id. §§ 8-503-8-504.
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revised Article 8, like the drafters of the ABA Digital Signature
Guidelines, worked to create an original conceptual framework for
commercial practices that differed markedly from historical models.
The drafters of revised Article 8, unlike the drafters of the Guidelines,
were defining new legal concepts to describe existing commercial
practices. The agenda of the drafters of the Guidelines was set not
simply by a desire to anticipate future developments but also to guide
those developments toward the use of what the drafters believed was a
superior technological solution. The experience of the drafters of the
1978 Article 8 demonstrates how uncertain the outcome can be of
attempts to use law to direct the choice of technology in commercial
practices.
C. Assigning Liabilityfor FraudorErrorin the Use of Rapidly
Evolving Technology
The rapid emergence of Internet commerce and the jockeying of
various interest groups for places in this emerging landscape is putting
pressure on legislatures to consider devising a regulatory regime even
before it is clear which business models will be successful for the
Internet and which will not.393 The Clinton administration's position
on Internet electronic commerce is that, in the absence of information
indicating the need for regulation, legislatures should hesitate to
intervene in the working of the marketplace. 394 Nevertheless, in light
of the existing law of signatures, the experience of revising the UCC to
take account of emerging technologies, and current legislative
initiatives in the area of electronic commerce, certain conclusions may
be drawn regarding appropriate legislation in this area.
1.

Presumptions and Reasonable Authentication Procedures

No presumptions of validity should attach to an authentication
procedure based exclusively on an assessment of the technology
embodied in it. The validity of signatures under general principles of
contract law is determined in light of the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the signature. While negotiable instruments law
departs from this general rule to create the presumption of the validity
of a signature, this is based on generations of experience with the use
393. The mere willingness of major multinational corporations to invest millions of
dollars in a business model is no guarantee of its likely success, as was recently demonstrated
by the flop of interactive TV. See Mike Mills, Tune Warner to Drop Interactive TV Project,
WASH. POST, May 2, 1997, at G1.
394. See J. Greg Phelan, White House Gets Wise to E-Commerce, N. N.J. REcoRD,
July 7, 1997, at H9.
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of negotiable instruments in commerce. Furthermore, the harshness of
negotiable instruments law is ameliorated with regard to consumers
generally by modem regulatory modifications of traditional
commercial law doctrines. With regard to electronic commercial
practices designed for and primarily targeted at consumers, there are
caps on consumer liability for unauthorized use that mitigate the need
to disclose fully and accurately to consumers the potential risks that
they face from adopting the technology.
Commercial applications of the Internet are being aggressively
marketed at consumers with disclosures that seem unlikely to
communicate effectively to consumers the potential risks that they face
from adopting these technologies. In the absence of any caps on
liability for consumers or provisions for dispute resolution procedures
on terms that guarantee consumers a meaningful opportunity to contest
their liability, there should be no presumption that increases the
already substantial burdens that any consumer will face in contesting
the validity of an unauthorized use of an authentication procedure.
The strategy of the Guidelines in proposing evidentiary presumptions
regarding the validity of digital signatures seems to be to promote the
acceptance of digital signatures by granting relying parties an effective
enforcement mechanism. A more equitable and efficient way to
promote the use of digital signatures can be accomplished by the
development of digital signature applications that are cheap and easy
for consumers and merchants to use. This is because the prudent
design of security systems will include digital signatures as a matter of
principle once the total cost of adopting this technology is less than the
expected loss that might result from a breach of security that this
technology can prevent.
If any authentication procedure should be presumed valid, it
should be a "reasonable authentication procedure" modeled after the
commercially reasonable security procedure of UCC Article 4A or the
evidentiary factors that the Rhode Island electronic commerce statute
advises the trier of fact to consider. The concept of reasonable
authentication procedure should include some reference to the
circumstances of the signer that are or that should have been known by
the other contracting party. These factors might include: information
about how access to the authentication procedure is controlled by the
signer; whether the product of the authentication procedure will reveal
any attempts to modify it after the completion of the authentication
procedure; whether the product of the authentication procedure can be
verified with reference to some external and trustworthy standard of
comparison; whether the product of the authentication procedure is
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unique to the party to be bound by its use;'and the reliability of the
authentication procedure in light of the intended use of the procedure.
2.

Assigning Liability in Order to Reduce the Rate of Loss

Fraud losses are inevitable in any commercial market. While it is
not yet clear whether fraud losses in Internet commerce will be greater
or less than those in more established markets, it is certain that losses
will occur. Public key cryptography is a powerful tool to counteract
some of the threats to electronic commerce, but unless its deployment
is integrated into an overall strategy of risk management then the
security that it offers may be illusory. The power of public key
cryptography to safeguard communications may create a "steel doors
and paper walls" problem if those who rely395on it fail to consider the
other factors contributing to system security.
The intense focus on the length of keys used to encrypt messages
is an example of this kind of skewed emphasis in analyzing computer
security problems. A great deal of publicity has surrounded the recent
successful brute force attacks on 40-bit and 56-bit keys. 396 The press
coverage of these feats of cryptanalysis often fail to point out the huge
commitment of computing resources required to break these keys to
decrypt a single message. The risk to a security system from attacks
on the system, or on the human administrators of the system, may be
much greater because397it can achieve greater results for the interloper
with much less effort.
Incentives for the more technologically sophisticated participants
to define and encourage the maintenance of an appropriate level of
security for the merchants and consumers in the Internet marketplace
should be incorporated into any statutory regime that governs the legal
395. This metaphor was suggested by Susan Nycum, Esq., of Baker & McKenzie,
Palo Alto, California.
396. Responding to a $10,000 challenge from RSA Data Security, Inc., U.C. Berkeley
graduate student Ian Goldberg broke a 40-bit key-the most secure data encryption the U.S.
government allows for export-in three and a half hours. Goldberg broke it by linking 250
workstations and programming them to run all possible combinations at a rate of 100 billion
per hour. See Sharon Machlis, RSA Stunt Shows Up Encryption Weakness, COMPUTER

WORLD, Feb. 3, 1997, at 1. In June 1997, responding to a $10,000 challenge from RSA Data
Security, a loosely organized group of cryptography industry experts managed to break a 56bit key after five months of work. The group distributed code-breaking software over the
Internet and used idle computers around the world to perform the calculations. See Lynda
Radosevich, Hackers Prove56-bit DES Is Not Enough, INFOwoRLD, June 30, 1997.

397. For example, video pirates sold decoder boxes to unscramble satellite TV
,broadcasts that did not break the encryption but penetrated the system that deployed the
encryption. See GARI-NKEL & SPAFFORD, supranote 35, at 199. Similarly, some successful
attacks on Netscape's SSL protocol have been based on the weakness of the system, not on
the encryption. See id
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effect of authentication procedures in Internet commerce. It is clear
that many of the merchants and consumers entering or considering
participation in the Internet marketplace today are not competent to
evaluate the security of the systems they are using and that the
information being provided by many technology developers with their
products is not likely to build that competence. Technology vendors
are so busy racing to stake claims on the frontier of electronic
commerce that the experience of the end users is not fully
considered.398 The technology of Internet commerce is changing and
developing rapidly. However, with appropriate incentives, technology
vendors may be able to develop products that permit less
technologically sophisticated parties to maintain trustworthy systems
with a minimum of effort.
VeriSign's response to the criticism that consumers of its Digital
IDs face unreasonable risks from losses due to unauthorized use of the
subscriber's private key is an example of this process. VeriSign as CA
provides only the limited review functions described in its CPS before
issuing a certificate and does not have any involvement in subsequent
transactions conducted in reliance on the information in the certificate,
beyond making a certification revocation list available for the
reference of a relying party. However, a relying party can be expected
to take note of information included in the certificate itself or
incorporated into it by reference to some document available
elsewhere. 399 For example, a certificate will normally have an
operational period, and reliance on the certificate after the expiration
of that operational period would not be reasonable.400 The X.509
version 3 standard for digital signature certificates permits relevant
40
information in the certificate to be added by the subscriber. 1
Through the use of these extensions, the subscriber may set a dollar
limit above which reliance on the certificate is not reasonable.
Setting a reliance limit in the certificate is only a partial solution,
however. This certificate-based limitation on subscriber liability does
not solve the problem for a subscriber if the private key and the
certificate could be used by an interloper to enter into a large number
of transactions in an extremely short period of time, creating an
aggregate liability far in excess of the transaction limit. VeriSign's
NetSure insurance scheme is a partial solution to this problem in that it
398. See Cern Kaner, A FairApproach to Software Developer Liability (July 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
399. See INFORMATION SEcurIY COMMTrrEE, supranote 2, § 5.4, at 112-13.
400. See FORD & BAUM, supra note 98, at 384.
401. See id at 223.
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provides warranties to the subscriber that it will not be liable for
unauthorized use or disclosure of the subscriber's private
key during
4 02
the period in which the Digital ID certificate is valid.
The problem might be capable of resolution through the use of
policy extensions that communicate to a relying party additional
limitations on the authorized use of the digital signature.4 3 One such
policy extension that a consumer might request would be that no
transaction over $10 is a valid obligation of the consumer unless the
relying party establishes some "out of band" or "back channel"
communication with the consumer, such as a phone call to confirm the
agreement. 4° While use of such a policy extension will raise the
transaction cost for each transaction entered into by a consumer using
a digital signature, the increased transaction cost will not necessarily
reduce the total number of transactions conducted over the Internet. If
consumers come to believe that the Internet is not yet secure enough
for retail transactions in the absence of an absolute cap on consumer
liability such as the liability limit on credit card transactions, then in
the absence of consumer protection legislation capping consumer
liability the total volume of consumer transactions not conducted using
credit cards may remain small.
If consumers of new technologies are provided adequate
disclosures regarding reasonable security practices, then consumers
can make a meaningful contribution to the overall incidence of losses
due to unauthorized use or fraud. However, empirical evidence on the
behavior of market participants, whether consumers or supposedly
more sophisticated parties, indicates that there are very real cognitive
limitations on the ability of market participants to make decisions on a
fully informed and rational basis.4 05 In the words of Herbert Simon,
the Nobel laureate economist, "The scarce resource is computational
capacity-the mind.' '4°6 Simon noted that market participants will
exercise a bounded rationality in decisionmaking because of the
inherent limitations on time, effort, and comprehensional capacity.
The fact that human actors are not capable of achieving perfect
402. The warranty to the subscriber does not apply, however, if the subscriber fails to
exercise "reasonable care" in safeguarding his or her private key. See VeriSign Web Site,
Netsure Protection Plan (visited Jan. 21, 1998) <http://www.verisign.com/repository/netsure/>.
403. See FoRD & BAUM, supranote 98, at 285.
404. Cern Kaner, J.D., Ph.D., suggested this.
405. See Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability,
73 CAL L. REv. 677, 678-80 (1985); Cass Sunstein, BehavioralAnalysis of Law, 64 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1175, 1175-76 (1997).
406. Herbert Simon, Rationality as Processand as Product of Thought, 1978 Am.
EcoN. REv. PAPERs & PRoc. 1, 12 (1978).
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rationality in analyzing problems does not suggest that their
problemsolving techniques are unpredictable or random.
The
deviations from formally rational analysis of problems is often quite
predictable with reference to concepts such as endowment effects and
loss aversion,
framing, self-serving bias, unrealistic optimism, and
407
anchoring.
If the biases and heuristics used by consumers in analyzing
electronic commerce problems can be established empirically, then the
manner in which liability is allocated to consumers and the magnitude
of the risks of loss allocated to consumers can be designed to take
advantage of the contribution to system security that consumers
realistically can be expected to make. Beyond that point, however, a
rational system of loss allocation for electronic commerce should shift
the losses either to the technology developers or to an insurance
system. For example, a technology developer might incorporate
greater use of biometric or token technologies that do not depend on
constant vigilance for their effectiveness in consumer electronic
commerce applications. The increased cost of personal computers
incorporating biometric technologies, such as authentication
procedures using fingerprints or smartcard readers, charged to all users
of the system would operate as a form of insurance.
V.

CONCLUSION

Commercial law is in the process of adapting to meet the
challenges posed by electronic commerce conducted over open
networks. Authentication procedures are an essential element in the
security policies and procedures that will be essential to the
commercial exploitation of the Internet.
Although electronic
communications are an integral element of Internet commerce, and
encryption provides a strong solution to the problems of authentication
and communication security, the mere fact that public key encryption
has been used is only part of the information needed to establish the
intent of the parties to form a binding contract.
The rush to bring to market products using public key encryption
has encouraged the developers and promoters to seek legislative safe
harbors to permit them to focus on the work of constructing a public
key infrastructure of potentially global reach. However, sheltering the
developers of these new technologies while allocating the risk of loss
due to unauthorized or fraudulent use of the technology to less
sophisticated consumers of the -technology will undermine the
407. See Sunstein, supra note 405, at 1179-91.
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developers' incentives to continue to improve the overall security of
Internet commerce systems. Refraining from legislation, or legislating
to provide some protection to less sophisticated consumers, will permit
the market to continue to develop without the distorting effects of
unresponsive or burdensome regulation.

